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It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens 
in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever 
they pleased, ... and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public 
and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to 
hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms 
wherever they went.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The often strident debate over the Second Amendment2 is like few others 
in American constitutional discourse and historiography. It is a constitu­
tional debate that has taken place largely in the absence of Supreme Court 
opinion.3 It is a historical controversy where the framers' intentions have 
1. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 4.17 (1857) (emphasis added). 
2. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
3. The Supreme Court has directly ruled on Second Amendment claims in only four cases. See 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illi­
nois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). Proponents of the 
collective rights theory have frequently cited these cases as supportive of their views. It is more 
accurate to describe the first three cases as having recognized the individual right, but also as having 
construed the Second Amendment as a bar to federal, but not state or private, infringement of the 
right. See infra Part III. United States v. Miller limited the Second Amendment's protection to 
weapons useful for militia duty. See infra Part IV. Since then, a number of lower federal courts 
have heard Second Amendment claims, often dismissing them on grounds that the Amendment has 
not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, which would make it binding on the states. 
Other courts have dismissed the claims by employing the collective rights theory. Almost all of 
these cases involved persons involved in criminal activity who were also convicted of firearms 
charges and thus are not really a good test of the extent to which the Second Amendment protects 
the rights of the public at large. See, e.g., United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever 
Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974) (statute prohibiting possession offirearms by previ­
ously convicted felon does not infringe upon Second Amendment). In a recent case in which a 
federal court sustained a general prohibition against handgun ownership, the Supreme Court re­
fused to consider the case on appeal. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). 
If the federal jurisprudence concerning the Second Amendment is somewhat thin, it should be 
noted that there is extensive case law concerning analogous provisions in state bills of rights. In­
deed it is likely, should the Supreme Court ever seriously consider the question, that it might bor­
row Second Amendment doctrine from the state courts. For some recent constructions of state 
right to keep and bear arms provisions see, e.g., Hoskins v. State, 449 So.2d 1269 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1984) (statute prohibiting a person convicted of committing a crime of violence from owning or 
possessing a pistol does not deny right to keep and bear arms); Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (statute permitting revocation of pistol permit for cause and providing 
notice of revocation and opportunity for de novo postrevocation hearing does not violate citizen's 
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best been gleaned from indirect rather than direct evidence.4 It is a scholarly 
debate that members of the academy have been until recently somewhat re­
luctant to join, 5 leaving the field to independent scholars primarily concerned 
with the modem gun control controversy. 6 In short, the Second Amendment 
right to bear anns); State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 12 3 (Me. 1986) (statue prohibiting possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon does not violate constitutional right to keep and bear arms); People v. 
Smelter, 437 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (statute prohibiting possession of stun guns docs 
not impermissibly infringe upon right to keep and bear arms); State v. Vlacil, 645 P .2d 677 (Utah 
1982) (statute making it a Class A misdemeanor for any noncitizen to own or possess a dangerous 
weapon is not unconstitutional). For a historical discussion of state right to keep and bear arms 
provisions, see generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL 
BILLS OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989). 
4. The debates in the House of Representatives over what became the Second Amendment (it 
was originally proposed as the Fourth Amendment) centered on a clause excepting conscientious 
objectors from militia duty. The original text of the Amendment read: "A well regulated militia. 
composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not. be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled 
to bear arms." THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 210 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). The House debate, focusing on the religious exemption, sheds little light on the individual 
versus collective rights debate, although the phrase "body of the people" used to describe the militia 
does suggest the idea of a militia of the whole. Still, the best evidence of the framen' intentions in 
this matter comes from the surrounding history and the comments of the constitutional framers 
generally with respect to the composition of the militia. See infra Part I. 
5. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 639-42 
(1989) (discussing the reluctance of most constitutional scholars to treat the Second Amendment as 
a subject worthy of serious scholarly or pedagogical consideration). Recently, however, one scholar 
has examined the Second Amendment within the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole. See Akhil 
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). In Amar's view, the Bill of 
Rights was designed with both populist and collective concerns in mind. It was designed to protect 
both the right of the people and to prevent potential tyranny from an overreaching federal govern­
ment. Amar sees the purpose of the Second Amendment as preventing Congress from disarming 
freemen, so that the populace could resist tyranny imposed by a standing army. Id. at 1162-73. 
6. See, e.g., David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited. 5 FORD­
HAM URe. L.J. 31 (1976) (current efforts to limit firearm possession undermine the Second Amend­
ment's twin goals of individual and collective defense); Robert Dowlut, Federal and State 
Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59 (1989) (laws seeking to disarm the 
people violate the Second Amendment); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution 
or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65 (1983) (interpretation of the Second 
Amendment is controlled by the framers' intent to guarantee the individual right to. 
keep and bear 
arms rather than a more narrow judicial interpretation); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Hemgan, 
The Second Amendment i n  the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia lately?. 15 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989) (Second Amendment's historical origins erect no real barrier to federal 
or state laws affecting handguns); Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 63 (1982) (advocates of gun control have twisted the 
original and plain meaning of the Second Amendment); Alan M. Gottlieb, Gun <Jw_nership: A. Con­
stitutional Right, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 113 (1982) (modem antipathy to firearms has mftuenced inter­
pretation of the Second Amendment as a collective right); David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment 
and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & PoL. l (1987) (the Second Am�dment has a 
dual purpose stemming from the merger of the militia and the right to bear arms prov1s1ons); May­
nard H. Jackson, Jr., Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed .. 8 N.C. CENT. L.J
. 
189 ( 1977) (Second Amendment is central to any discussion of the legal ments of g.un contro
l); 
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to Self-Preserwwon. 39 ALA. 
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is an arena of constitutional jurisprudence that still awaits its philosopher. 
The debate over the Second Amendment is ultimately part of the larger 
debate over gun control, a debate about the extent to which the Amendment 
was either meant to be or should be interpreted as limiting the ability of 
government to prohibit or limit private ownership of firearms. Waged in the 
popular press, 7 in the halls of Congress, 8 and increasingly in historical and 
L. REV. 103 (1987) (suggesting a Second Amendmen t  jurisprudence consistent with modern treat­
ment of the Bill of Rights such that handgun regulation be reasonably tailored to public safety); 
James A. McClure, Firearms and Federalism, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 197 (1970) (Second Amendment 
precludes federal interference but leaves to debate the issue of state regulation of handguns); Robert 
J. Riley, Shooting to Kill the Handgun: Time to Martyr Another American ''Hero," 51 J. URB. L. 
491 (1974) (construing the Second Amendment as a surpassable barrier to handgun control by 
finding the handgun a weapon of marginal military utility); Jonathan A. Weiss, A R eply to Advo­
cates of Gun Control Law. 52 J. URB. L. 577 (1974) (placing the Second Amendment in context of 
the Bill of Rights, provides an inviolable right to bear arms and an absolute bar to government 
restriction). 
Two advocates of the individual rights theory who are outside the academy, but have nonetheless 
been quite instrumental in influencing the constitutional debate among law teachers and historians, 
are Donald B. Kates, Jr. and Stephen P. Halbrook. See, e.g .. Donald B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohi­
bition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983) (Second 
Amendment right to bear arms, applicable against both federal and state government, does not 
foreclose, but limits, gun control options); Donald B. Kates, Jr., The Second A mendment: A Dia­
logue, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986) (Second Amendment substantially limits the arbi­
trariness of granting gun permits); Steven. P. Halbrook, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984) [hereinafter HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE 
ARMED] (the right of citizens to keep and bear arms has deep historical roots and overly restrictive 
interpretations of the Second Amendment are associated with reactionary concepts including elit­
ism, militarism, and racism); Steven P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Secon d  and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 1 (1981) (the fundamental character of the Second 
Amendment and the increasingly restrictive forms of gun control legislation necessitate Supreme 
Court precedent on the status of the Amendment's applicability to the states); Stephen P. Halbrook, 
What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms," 49 LA w & CoN­
TEMP. PRoes. 151 ( 1986) (Second Amendment right to bear arms is incompatible with the sugges­
tion of no right to bear arms without state or federal permission). 
7. See, e.g .. Daniel Abrams, What 'Right to Bear Arms'?, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1989, at A23; 
Robert J. Cottrol, It's Time to Enforce the Second Amendment, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 
17, 1990, at 5B; Ervin N. Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment Rights, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 
1990, at C7; Sue Wimmershotf-Caplan, The Founde r s  and the AK-47, WASH. POST, July 6, 1989, at 
A 18. Even former Chief Justice Warren Burger has used this arena to opine on  the subject. See 
Warren Burger, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, PARADE MAG., Jan. 14, 1 990, at 4. 
For one interesting example of a writer who (reluctantly) supports the individual rights interpre­
tation of the Second Amendment and who, as a member of the gun control group Handgun Con­
trol, Inc., is also a strong advocate of stricter gun control, see columnist Michael Kinsley, Slicing 
Up th� Second Amendment. WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1990, at A25. More recently, conservative colum­
nist George
. 
Will, also an advocate of stricter gun control, has stated that "The National Rifle 
Assoc1atton 1s perhaps 
.
correct and certainly plausible in its 'strong' reading of the Second Amend­
ment protection for pnvate
. 
gun ownership." Will argues for repeal of the Second Amendment on 
the grounds that the n
.
ght 1s �ot as important as it was 200 years ago. 
Will also makes the mterestmg observation that "The subject of gun control reveals a role rever­sal between liberals an
_
d c?nservatives that makes both sides seem tendentious. Liberals who usu­ally argue that const1tut1ona� rights (of criminal defendants, for example) must be respected regardless of mconvemcnt social consequences say that the s d A d · h · t stly • econ men ment ng t 1s oo co 
1991] THE SECOND AMENDMENT 313 
legal journals, 9 two dominant interpretations have emerged. Advocates of 
stricter gun controls have tended to stress the Amendment's Militia Clause, 
arguing that the purpose of the Amendment was to ensure that state militias 
would be maintained against potential federal encroachment. This argu­
ment, embodying the collective rights theory, sees the framers' primary, in­
deed sole, concern as one with the concentration of military power in the 
hands of the federal government, and the corresponding need to ensure a 
decentralized military establishment largely under state control. to 
Opponents of stricter gun controls have tended to stress the Amendment's 
second clause, arguing that the framers intended a militia of the whol�r at 
least the entire able-bodied white male-population, expected to perform its 
duties with privately owned weapons.11 Advocates of this view also fre­
quently urge that the Militia Clause should be read as an amplifying, rather 
than a qualifying, clause. They argue that, while maintaining a "well-regu­
lated militia"12 was the predominate reason for including the Second 
Amendment in the Bill of Rights, it should not be viewed as the sole or 
to honor. Conservatives who frequently favor applying cost-benefit analysis to constitutional con­
struction (of defendants' rights, for example) advocate an absolutist construction of the Second 
Amendment." See George Will, Oh That Annoying Second Amendment: It Shows No Signs of 
Going Away, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, March 22, 1991. 
Although the Second Amendment and gun control debates involve far more than a simple lib­
eral/conservative dichotomy, there are numerous exceptions on both sides; Will's point is well 
taken. If we accept the conventional view that the National Rifte Association is a predominantly 
conservative organization and that advocates of gun control tend to be politically liberal, we can see 
rather interesting role reversals. For example, the NRA has attacked firearms bans in public hous­
ing, bans which mainly affect people who are poor and black, while liberal groups have generally 
remained silent on the issue. 
8. See THE RIGH T TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITU­
TION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, s. REP No. 522, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) [hereinaf­
ter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT). 
9. See id. ; see also Lawrence Delbert Cress & Robert E. Stalhope, The Second Amendment and 
the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. AM. HIST. 587 (1984) (debate whether correct interpre­
tation of Second Amendment rests on rights to bear arms or communal prerogatives implied in 
Militia Clause); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear A rms: The Commo n  
Law Tradition, 1 0  HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983), reprinted i n  FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: 
ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 391-95 (Donald B. Kates, Jr. ed. 1984) (proper reading of Second 
Amendment extends to every citizen right to bear arms for personal defense); Robert E . . s�alhope, 
The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 ( 1982) (armed citizen and 
militia existed as distinct, yet interrelated, elements within American republican thought)
. 
10. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 6, at 194 (the purpose of the Second Amendment was to main­
tain the militia, not to provide an individual right to bear arms); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing 
Armies and Armed Citizens: An A nalysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L'.Q. 961. 
963, 995, 1000 (1975) (Second Amendment was designed solely to protect the
 states ag�mst the 
f�deral government, using a historical analysis of the relationship between citizens and their sove
r­
eign as evidence). 
11. See, e. g., Halbrook, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 55-87; Kates, Han
dgun 
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, supra note 6, at 214-18, 27
3. 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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limiting reason. They argue that the framers also contemplated a right to 
individual and community protection.13 This view embodies the individual 
rights theory. 
This debate has raised often profound questions, but questions generally 
treated hastily, if at all, by the community of constitutional scholars. 14 For 
example, if one accepts the collective rights view of the Amendment, serious 
questions arise concerning whether the federal government's integration of 
the National Guard into the Army and, later, the Air Force have not in all 
but name destroyed the very institutional independence of the militia that is 
at the heart of what the collective rights theorists see as the framers' inten­
tions. 15 Even the gun control debate is not completely resolved by an accept­
ance of the collective rights theory. If the Second Amendment was designed 
to ensure the existence of somewhat independen t  state militias immune from 
federal encroachment, then the question arises to what extent states are free 
to define militia membership. Could a state include as members of its militia 
all adult citizens, thus permitting them an exemption from federal firearms 
restrictions? If, instead, the federal government has plenary power to define 
militia membership and chooses to confine such membership to the federally 
controlled National Guard, does the Second Amendment become a dead let­
ter under the collective rights theory? 
If the collective rights theory raises difficult questions, the individual rights 
theory raises perhaps even more difficult, and perhaps more interesting ones. 
Some of these questions are obvious and frequently asked, such as where to 
draw the line between an individual's right to possess arms and the corollary 
right to self-defense on the one hand, and the community's interest i n  public 
safety and crime control on the other. Other questions are more elusive, 
more difficult to pose as well as to answer. At the heart of the individual 
rights view is the contention that the framers of the Second Amendment 
intended to protect the right to bear arms for two related purposes. The first 
o� these was to ensure popular participation in the security of the commu­
m ��·
_
an outgrowth of the English and early American reliance on posses and 
m1ht1as made up of the general citizenry to provide police and military 
forces.16 The second purpose was to ensure an armed citizenry in order to 
prevent potential tyranny by a government empowered and perhaps embold­
ened by a monopoly of force. t 1 
1 J. Sa. <'-X·· Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, Jupru note 6. 
14. Set' .fupra note 5. 
15. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110 S. Ct. 2418, 2422-26 (1990) (discussing the his-tory of leg1slat10n governi ng the m1ht1a and the National Guard d C 
• l h ·t . , an ongress s p enary aut on Y 1wcr the National Guard). 
16. See Malcolm. Jupra note 9. at 290-95. 
17. See Stephen Halbrook's exploration of that idea within the co t f 1 · 1 i· · l h. n ext o c asstca po 1t1ca p 1-
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The second argument, that an armed populace might serve as a basis for 
resistance to tyranny, raises questions of its own. The framers had firsthand 
experience with such a phenomenon, but they lived in an age when the 
weapon likely to be found in private hands, the single shot musket or pistol, 
did not differ considerably from its military counterpart. Although the ar­
mies of the day possessed heavier weapons rarely found in private hands, 
battles were fought predominately by infantry or cavalry with weapons not 
considerably different from those employed by private citizens for personal 
protection or hunting.18 Battles in which privately armed citizens van­
quished regular troops, or at least gave "a good account of themselves," were 
not only conceivable-they happened.19 
Modem warfare has, of course, introduced an array of weapons that no 
government is likely to permit ownership by the public at large2° and that 
few advocates of the individual rights view would claim as part of the public 
domain. 21 The balance of power has shifted considerably and largely to the 
side of governments and their standing armies. For individual rights theo­
rists, this shift immediately raises the question of whether, given the tremen­
dous changes that have occurred in weapons technology, the framers' 
presumed intention of enabling the population to resist tyranny remains via­
ble in the modem world. 22 Although partly a question of military tactics, 
losophy in THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 7-35; see also Gardiner, supra note 6, at 
73-82 (the history of the Second Amendment indicates that one of its purposes was to ensure the 
existence of an armed citizenry as a defense against domestic tyranny); Lund, supra note 6, at 111-16 (Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms in order to secure his political 
freedom); Shalhope, supra note 9, at 610-13 (framers of the Second Amendment, motivated by their 
distrust of government, intended to protect the right of individuals to bear arms). 
18. The American civilian of the mid-18th century was typically armed with the "Pennsylvania" 
rifle, later to be known as the "Kentucky" rifle. See Daniel Boorstin's discussion of the relative 
merits of the Pennsylvania Rifte and the muskets that British soldiers were equipped with in 
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 350-51 (1958). 19. For one account of the battles of Lexington and Concord, see DAVID HAWKE, THE COLO­
NIAL EXPERIENCE 573-78 (1966). 20. It shoul d  not be necessary to detail such obvious examples as stinger �issiles and nu�lear 
weapons, but even more ordinary military weapons are also unlikely to be permitted to the pubhc at 
large. For example, the U.S. Anny expects every soldier, regardless of military special�y, to be 
proficient with the M203 grenade launcher (a shoulder-fired light mortar capable of firing a 40 
millimeter high explosive round 400 meters), the M72A2 light antitank weapon (LAW) (a hand­
held disposable antitank weapon capable o f  penetrating an armored vehicle at 300 meters), the M67 
fragmentatio n  grenade, and the Ml8AI Claymore antipersonnel mine. See DEPARTMENT OF THE 
ARMY, SOLDIER'S MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS: SKILL LEVEL l (1985). 21. For one of the better efforts to reconcile modern weaponry with the type of weapons the 
framers intended to protect, see Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment, supra note 6, at 204, 261. . . . . .  22. We are putting aside for the moment the question of the utihty ?r po�ent�al. uttl�ty of an armed population as a useful auxiliary to national or local governments m mamtammg either na­
tional or community security. It should be noted that during the Second World War, when the 
National Guar d  had been mobilized into the Army, impromptu home defense forces-some organ­
ized by state governments, some privately organized-patrolled beach areas and likely sabotage 
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and thus beyond the scope of this discussion,23 it is also a constitutional ques-
sights. The individuals who performed this service were usually equip�d �ith their own w�a�ns. 
And while this American version of "Dad's Army" encountered no s1gmficant enemy activ1ty­
doubtless to the relief of all concerned, particularly the participants-the utility of these patrols 
should be noted. If such patrols were necessary, and some undoubtedly were, from the military 
point of view, it was probably better to have civilian auxiliaries performing this function, freeing 
regular military units for more pressing duties. See id. at 272 n.284. It should also be noted that, 
immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian territorial governor ordered citizens to 
report with their own firearms for defense of the Islands in anticipation of Japanese invasion. Ironi­
cally, given the later treatment of Japanese Americans on the m ainland, a good percentage of the 
men who made up the citizens' home guard in Hawaii were of Japanese descent. See id. 
In light of our later discussion of whether or not, given the racial restriction in the Uniform 
Militia Act of 1792, free Negroes were considered part of the militia, see infra Part I.c.2, it should 
be noted that many of the individuals who served in these home guard organizations probably did 
not meet the statutory definition of militia members. By statute, membership in the militia is de­
fined as men from 18-45. Most men in that age group were in the armed forces during the Second 
World War so that those performing home guard duties were probably older and younger than the 
statutory age limits. See Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, supra note 6, at 272 n. 284 (research indicates that m e n  between the ages of 16 and 65 
served in home guard units). It is also probable that a fair number of women performed those tasks. 
For our purposes, what is interesting about this history is that it indicates that militia membership 
is even broader than the statutory definition. Perhaps the best way of  viewing the issue is to regard 
statutory militia provisions as defining those who may be compelled to perform militia service, but 
to realize that the whole population might be permitted to volunteer for militia service. 
23. Despite modem technological advances, the impotence o f  privately-armed civilians against 
organized armies is by no means obvious. Afghan guerrillas, to cite a recent example, were quite 
successful in resisting the Soviet Army largely with small arms. Harry Summers, retired Army 
Colonel and Professor at the Army War College, indicated in a recent column that he believed an 
armed population could resist a tyrannical government or at least do so better than an unarmed 
one. See Harry Summers, Gun Collecting and Lithuania, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at F4 
(public should protect its right to bear arms as a protection against government). 
There arc at least three ways to approach the question of an armed population resisting the 
government. The first is to look at what happens when actual armed conflict breaks out between a 
nation's military forces and the population or a segment of the population. Although modem tech­
nology weights the odds heavily in the government's favor, other considerations, including whether 
or not military forces arc overextended, the skill of the population in general with arms (which 
might be inftucnccd by the number of military veterans in the population or the number of people 
who regularly practice with firearms), the terrain, and the morale of military forces called upon to 
suppress the population, might tend to redress the technological imbalance. 
The second way. of viewing this question is to look at it as a question of deterrence. From this 
perspective, one might argue that, even if a government would ultimately win a confrontation with 
an 
_
armed population, the cost to the government is higher. It will endure substantially larger casu­
alties and may have to endure large scale destruction of economically valuable infrastructure in 
order to achieve its objectives. This higher cost might cause a government to seek compromise, or 
cause a reluctance on the part of many in the military to participate, even if ultimate victory was 
assured . In the Sov1e1 Union, press reports indicated great resistance on the part of citizens to 
�ndmg �cscrvists to the Azerbaijan region, in part because the population was armed and willing to 
r�ist. 5t•e Bill Keller.' �orbachev ls.rues Emergency f!ecree Over Azerbaijan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
1 90. a t A I (Azerba11am leader threatens armed resistance against military); Bill Keller, Moscow 
Di.�pou:hes 11.000 Troops to Azerbaij�n. N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1990, at Al (Gorbachev hes itated in sending
_ 
troops partly from fear of wide-scale popular resistance); Bill Keller, Troops Seek to Calm Aurbal}an: Soviets Dtbare Cause of Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1990 at Al (one reason for hesitation before send ing troops was fear of popular disapproval of sending troops to dangerous 
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tion. If private ownership of firearms is constitutionally protected, should 
this right be protected with the original military and political purposes in 
mind, or should the protection of firearms now be viewed as protecting only 
those weapons used for personal protection or recreation?24 Or, given that 
all firearms are potentially multi-purpose, and that all firearms potentially 
may be used for military, recreational, or personal defense as well as for 
criminal purposes, what effect should legislatures and courts give to the 
framers' original military rationale? Where should the proper lines be drawn 
with respect to modern firearms, all of which employ technologies largely 
unimag i ned by the framers?25 
Societal, as well as technological, changes raise questions for advocates of 
the individual rights view of the Second Amendment. In the eighteenth cen­
tury, the chief vehicle for law enforcement was the posse comitatus, and the 
major American military force was the militia of the whole. While these 
institutions are still recognized by modem law,26 they lie dormant in late 
twentieth-century America. Professional police forces and a standing mili-
area); Esther B. Fein, Gorbachev is Backed on Azerbaijan Combat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1990, at A8 
(Gorbachev criticized in the past for sending troops to control civil unrest); Bill Keller, Soviet 
Troops Bogged Down by Azerbaijanis Blockades of Railroads and Airfields, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
1990, at Al (many young Soviets not eager to be mobilized); Frances X. Clines, Soviet Force Said to 
Battle With Azerbaijani Militants: Call Up of Reserves Halted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at Al 
(Moscow ends mobilization of reservists after wide protests); Bill Keller, Cry of Won't Give Up My 
Son! And Soviets End the Call-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at A6 (same). 
The third consideration is the one most relevant to the Afro-American experience. Governmen­
tal oppression can occur when the state actively oppresses the population or a segment of the popu­
lation. It can also occur when the state displays an active indifference to the denial of one segment 
of the population's rights by another. This occurred most vividly for blacks during the Jim Crow 
era. See infra Part IV. 
24. The latter appears to be the view taken by former Chief Justice Burger. See Burger, supra 
note 7, at 4. 
25. In the 18th century, when the Second Amendment was adopted, firearms were single shot 
devices that were reloaded very slowly. Firearms were loaded by pouring black gunpowder down 
the muzzle of the firearm, followed by a separate bullet (usually a lead ball); the load was then 
rammed down with a ramrod. By way of contrast, modem firearms are usually loaded with self­
contained cartridges-cartridges where the bullet and the powder are contained in one single cap­
sule. Almost all modem firearms, with the exception of a few firearms designed almost exclusively 
for target shooting or training children in the use of firearms, are repeaters: they can fire more than 
one bullet before the shooter has to reload. Among the types of repeating firearms that exist today 
are revolvers (pistols with between five and nine rotating cylinders), manually operated rifles and 
shotguns, firearms that require the operation of a lever or bolt between pulls of the trigger in order 
to make a new round of ammunition ready to fire, semiautomatic firearms (pistols, rifles, and shot­
guns capable of firing a new round with each pull of the trigger), and automatic firearms (weapons 
that will fire a new round as long as the shooter depresses the trigger). These new developments 
make all modern firearms much more rapid fire than those employed in the 18th century. For 
books that illustrate the history of firearms technology, see ROBERT HELD, THE AGE OF FIRE· 
ARMS, A PICTORIAL HISTORY (1957); BASIL P. HUGHES, FIREPOWER: WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS 
ON THE BATTLE FIELD, 1630-1850 (1975); HAROLD L. PETERSON, THE TREASURY OF THE GUN 
( 1962). 
26. See, e.g .. 10 U.S.C. § 3l l (1988) (unorganized militia consists of all men between the ages of 
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tary establishment assisted by semi-professional auxiliaries-the reserves and 
the National Guard-have largely assumed the roles of public protection and 
national security. It is possible that the concept of a militia of the armed 
citizenry has been largely mooted by social change. 
Yet, the effect of social change on the question of the Second Amendment 
is a two-edged sword. If one of the motivating purposes behind the Second 
Amendment was to provide a popular check against potential governmental 
excess, then does the professionalization of national and community security 
make the right to keep and bear arms even more important in the modern 
context? Furthermore, the question remains whether the concept of a militia 
of the whole is worth re-examining: Did the framers, by adopting the Second 
Amendment, embrace a republican vision of the rights and responsibilities of 
free citizens that, despite the difficulties, should somehow be made to work 
today? 
Finally, the Second Amendment debate raises important questions con­
cerning constitutional interpretation, questions that need to be more fully 
addressed by legal historians and constitutional commentators. It poses im­
portant questions about notions of the living Constitution, and to what ex­
tent that doctrine can be used to limit as well as extend rights. It also poses 
important questions about social stratification, cultural bias, and constitu­
tional interpretation. Do courts really protect rights explicit or implicit in 
the Constitution, or is the courts' interpretation of rights largely a dialogue 
with the elite, articulate sectors of society, with the courts enforcing those 
rights favored by dominant elites and ignoring those not so favored? 
Many of the issues surrounding the Second Amendment debate are raised 
in particularly sharp relief from the perspective of African-American history. 
With the exception of Native Americans, no people in American history have 
been more influenced by violence than blacks. Private and public violence 
maintained slavery.27 The nation's most destructive conflict ended the "pe­
culiar institution. "2" That all too brief experiment in racial egalitarianism, 
Reconstruction, was ended by private violence29 and abetted by Supreme 
Court sanction.'0 Jim Crow was sustained by private violence, often with 
1 ll and 45. and fcmalCli who are com�issioned National Guard officers); Williams v. State, 490 
S. W. 2d . 1 1 7, 1 2 1  (Arie I 973) (recognmng the continued validity of the posse comitatus power). 
27 . .  ')c•c K ENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECUUAR INSTITUTION :  SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM 
Sou rn 1 4 1 -9 1  ( I  956). 
2ll. The Civil War CO<;I lhe Union and Confederate armies a combined casualty total of 498,332 deaths . By way of contrast. World War II,  the nation's second bloodiest conflict, cost the United 
Slates 407 . . ' 1 6  fatal it ies. See Tur WoRLn ALMANAC & BooK OF FACTS 793 (Mark S. Hoffman 
ed . . l 'N I )  
29. St'•' !i•'ncra//y ERK FON ER, R H.ONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION ,  l lltiJ- 1 8 7 7 .  at  �M-bCX) ( I Q88):  GEORGE c RABl.E, BUT THERE WAS No PEACE: THE ROLE OF 
V1<> 1  !'.�CT 1:-.- nu 1'01 nrcs Of· R ECONSTRUCTION ( 1 984). 
JO. s,.,., <'.I(.. Li mlcd State<; \ · Harris. 106 U.S. 629 ( 1 882) (holding unconstitutional a federal 
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public assistance. 3 1  
If today the memories of past interracial violence are beginning to fade, 
they are being quickly replaced by the frightening phenomenon of black-on­
black violence, making life all too precarious for poor blacks in inner city 
neighborhoods. 32 Questions raised by the Second Amendment, particularly 
those concerning self-defense, crime, participation in the security of the com­
munity, and the wisdom or utility of relying exclusively on the state for pro­
tection, thus take on a peculiar urgency in light of the modem Afro­
American experience. 
This article explores Second Amendment issues in light of the Afro-Amer­
ican experience, concluding that the individual rights theory comports better 
with the history of the right to bear arms in England and Colonial and post­
Revolutionary America. The article also suggests that Second Amendment 
issues need to be explored, not only with respect to how the right to keep and 
bear arms has affected American society as a whole, but also with an eye 
toward subcultures in American society who have been less able to rely on 
state protection. 
The remainder of this article is divided into five parts. Part I examines the 
historical tension between the belief in the individual's right to bear arms and 
the desire to keep weapons out of the hands of "socially undesirable" groups. 
The English distrust of the lower classes, and then certain religious groups, 
was replaced in America by a distrust of two racial minorities: Native Amer­
icans and blacks. Part II examines antebellum regulations restricting black 
firearms ownership and participation in the militia. Part III examines the 
intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the 
Second Amendment and how nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases limit­
ing the scope of the Second Amendment were part of the general tendency of 
the courts to limit the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part also 
examines restrictions on firearms ownership aimed at blacks in the postbel­
lum South and the role of private violence in reclaiming white domination in 
the South.  Part IV examines black resistance to the violence that accompa­
nied Jim Crow. In Part V, the article suggests directions of further inquiry 
regarding political access, the current specter of black-on-black crime, and 
the question of gun control today. 
c�minal statute designed to protect equal privileges and immunities fo_r blacks fr�m �nvasion by Pnvate persons); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 ( 1 876) (holding unconst1tut1onal a. f�d­era� criminal statute designed to prevent whites from conspiring to prevent blacks from exercising 
their constitutional rights). 
3 I .  See infra Part IV. 
32. See infra Part V. 
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[. ARMED CITIZENS, FREEMEN, AND WELL-REGULATED MILITIAS: THE 
BEGINNINGS OF AN AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 
Any discussion of the Second Amendment should begin with the common­
place observation that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not believe they 
were creating new rights. 33 Instead, they believe d  that they were simply rec­
ognizing rights already part of their English constitutional heritage and im­
plicit in natural law.34 In fact, many of the framers cautioned against a bill 
of rights, arguing that the suggested rights were inherent to a free people, and 
that a specific detailing of rights would suggest that the new constitution 
empowered the federal government to violate other traditional rights not 
enumerated. 35 
Thus, an analysis of the framers' intentions with respect to the Second 
Amendment should begin with an examination of their perception of the 
right to bear arms as one of the traditional rights of Englishmen, a right 
necessary to perform the duty of militia service. Such an analysis is in part 
an exercise in examining the history of arms regulation and militia service in 
English legal history. But a simple examination of the right to own weapons 
at English law combined with an analysis of the history of the militia in 
English society is inadequate to a full understanding of the framers' under­
standing of what they meant by "the right to keep and bear arms." By the 
time the Bill of Rights was adopted, nearly two centuries of settlement in 
North America had given Americans constitutional sensibilities similar to, 
but nonetheless distinguishable from, those of their English counterparts.36 
American settlement had created its own history with respect to the right to 
bear arms, a history based on English tradition, modified by the American 
experience, and a history that was sharply influenced by the racial climate in 
the American colonies. 
33.  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 84-89, 
1 9 3-94 ( 1 967). 
34 . . Id. Especially pertinent is John Philip Reid's reminder: "There are other dimensions that the �andmg·anny con
.
troversy, �hen studied from the perspective of law, adds to our knowledge of the 
mencan Revolullon. One is the degree to which eighteenth-century Americans thought seventeenth­
century English thoughts . .. JOHN PHILLIP REIO, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING· A R M Y  CONTROVERSY, THE Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 4 ( 1 981)  (emphasis added). 
3 5 .  See, e.g .. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
36· Thi� can be seen with reference to the right of trial by jury. A number of scholars have noted �hat Ame
.
ncans '" th� late 1 8th century regarded the right of trial by jury as including the right to 
E
ave
. 
the Jury .decide issues of law as well as fact. This was, of course a departure from traditional nghsh practice. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATIO�
 
OF AMERICAN LA w 1 780-1 860. at 28-29 ( 1977)· WILL E 
, 
. 
 IAM DWARD NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: ���5 :MPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1 760-1830, at 3 - 4, 8, 20-30 
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A .  ENGLISH LAW AND TRADITION 
The English settlers who populated North America in the seventeenth cen­
tury were heirs to a tradition over five centuries old governing both the right 
and duty to be armed. At English law, the idea of an armed citizenry respon­
sible for the security of the community had long coexisted, perhaps some­
what uneasily, with regulation of the ownership of arms, particularly along 
class lines. The Assize of Arms of 1 18137 required the arming of all free 
men, and required free men to possess armor suitable to their condition. 38 
By the thirteenth century, villeins possessing sufficient property were also 
expected to be armed and contribute to the security of the community.39 
Lacking both professional police forces and a standing army,40 English law 
and custom dictated that the citizenry as a whole, privately equipped, assist 
in both law enforcement and in military matters. By law, all men between 
sixteen and sixty were liable to be summoned into the sheriff's posse comita­
tus. All subjects were expected to participate in the hot pursuit of criminal 
suspects, supplying their own arms for the occasion. There were legal penal­
ties for failure to participate. 41 
Moreover, able-bodied men were considered part of the militia, although 
by the sixteenth century the general practice was to rely on select groups 
intensively trained for militia duty rather than to rely generally on the armed 
male population. This move toward a selectively trained militia was an at­
tempt to remedy the often indifferent proficiency and motivation that oc­
curred when relying on the population as a whole.42 
Although English law recognized a duty to be armed, it was a duty and a 
right highly circumscribed by English class structure. The law often re­
garded the common people as a dangerous class, useful perhaps in defending 
shire and realm, but also capable of mischief with their weapons, mischief 
toward each other, toward their betters, and toward their betters' game. Re­
strictions on the type of arms deemed suitable for common people had long 
been part of English law and custom. A sixteenth-century statute designed 
as a crime control measure prohibited the carrying of handguns and cross-
37. SELECT CHARTERS & OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS Of ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN Of EDWARD THE FIRST 1 8 1-84 (H.W.C. Davis ed., 
Fred B. Cothman & Co. 1985) (192 1). 
38. I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY Of ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME Of EDWARD I 42 1-42, 565 ( 1968). 
39. Id. 
40. Historian Joyce Lee Malcolm notes that England did not have a standing army until the late 
1 7th century and did not have a professional police force until the nineteenth. See Malcolm, supra 
note 9, at 3 9 1 .  
4 1 .  ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 59 ( 1966); Malcolm, supra note 9, 
at 39 1 .  
42. Malcolm, supra note 9, at 391-92. 
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bows by those with incomes of less than 
.
one hundred po�nds a ye�r. 43 
Catholics were also often subject to being disarmed as potential subversives 
after the English reformation. 44 
It took the religious and political turmoil of seventeenth-century England 
to bring about large scale attempts to disarm the English public and to bring 
the right to keep arms under English constitutional protection. Post-Resto­
ration attempts by Charles II to disarm large portions of the population 
known or believed to be political opponents, and James H's efforts to disarm 
his Protestant opponents led, in 1689, to the adoption of the Seventh provi­
sion of the English Bill of Rights: "That the Subjects which are Protestants 
may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed 
by Law." 45 
By the eighteenth century, the right to possess arms, both for personal 
protection and as a counterbalance against state power, had come to be 
viewed as part of the rights of Englishmen by many on both sides of the 
A tlantic. Sir William Blackstone listed the right to possess arms as one of 
the five auxiliary rights of English subjects without which their primary 
rights could not be maintained. 46 He discussed the right in traditional Eng-
43. Id. at 393. 
44. Id. at 393-94. 
45. Id. at 408. 
46. l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143-45. Blackstone listed three primary 
rights-the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private prop­
erty-all of which he regarded as natural rights recognized and protected by the common law and 
statutes of England. He also argued that these would be "dead letters" without the five auxiliary 
rights which he listed as: ( l)  the constitution, powers and privileges of Parliament; (2) the limitation 
of the king's prerogative; (3) the right to apply to the courts of justice for redress of injuries; ( 4) the 
right of petitioning the King or either house of Parliament, and for the redress of grievances; and (5) 
the right of subjects to have arms for their defence. Id. at * 1 2 1- 45. 
Some commentators have argued that Blackstone's remarks and other evidence of English com­
mon-law and statutory rights to possess arms should be viewed in the light of the extensive regula­
tion of firearms that traditionally existed in England and also in light of English strict gun control in 
the 20th century. See, e.g .• SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & 
GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 142-43 ( 1987); Ehrman & Heni­
gan, supra note 6, at 9-10. Two points should be made in that regard. First, much of English 
fir�nns regulation had �n explicit class base largely inapplicable in the American context. Second, 
nett her a. comr_non la� nght to keep and bear arms nor a similar statutory right such as existed in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 would, in the light of Parliamentary supremacy, be a bar to 
suMequent statutes repealing or modifying that right. Blackstone is cited here not as evidence that 
the Engl
.
ish right, in �r�ise f�rrn and content, became the American right; instead it is evidence 
that the idea of an md1v1dual nght to keep and bear arms existed on both sides of the Atlantic in the 
1 8th century. 
Blackstone's importance to this discussion is twofold. His writings on the right to possess arms can be taken as pa.rtial evidence of what the framers of the Second Amendment regarded as among the nghts of Enghs
.
hmen that they sought to preserve. Blackstone's views greatly influenced late 1 8th-century Amencan legal thought. But Blackstone's importance in this regard does not cease with the Sa:ond Amendment. Blackstone also greatly influenced 1 9th-century American legal thinking. One influential antebellum American jurist, Justice Joseph Story, was significantly inftu-
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lish terms: 
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present men­
tion, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and 
degree, and such as are allowed by law, which is also declared by the same 
statute 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2 and is indeed a public allowance, under due 
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when 
the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the vio­
lence of oppression. 47 
B. ARMS AND RACE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 
323 
If the English tradition involved a right and duty to bear arms qualified by 
class and later religion, both the right and the duty were strengthened in the 
earliest American settlements. From the beginning, English settlement in 
North America had a quasi-military character, an obvious response to harsh 
frontier conditions. Governors of settlements often also held the title of mili­
tia captain, reflecting both the civil and military nature of their office. Spe­
cial effort was made to ensure that white men, capable of bearing arms, were 
imported into the colonies. 48 Far from the security of Britain, often border­
ing on the colonies of other frequently hostile European powers, colonial 
governments viewed the arming of able-bodied white men and the require­
ment that they perform militia service as essential to a colony's survival. 
There was another reason for the renewed emphasis on the right and duty 
to be armed in America: race. Britain's American colonies were home to 
three often antagonistic races: red, white, and black. For the settlers of Brit-
enced by his readings of Blackstone. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JumCE JOSEPH 
STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 4().45, 137, 246 (1 985). Story viewed the Second 
Amendment as vitally important in maintaining a free republic. In his Commentaries on the Consti· 
tution. he wrote: 
The right of the citizens to keep, and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palla· 
di um of the liberties of a republic; since it olfers a strong moral check against the usurpa­
tion and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if they are successful in the first 
instance, enable the people to resist, and triumph over them. 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 708 (Carolina 
Academic Press 1987) ( 1 833). 
While it would be inaccurate to attribute Story's Second Amendment views solely to hi5 reading 
of Blackstone, Blackstone doubtless helped inftuence Story and other early 191h-cen1ury lawyen 
and jurists to regard the right to keep and bear arms as an important prerogative of free citizen5. 
All of this is important for our discussion, not only with regard to antebellum opinion concerning 
the Second Amendment, but also in considering the cultural and legal climate that infonned the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment who intended to extend what were commonly regarded as 
the rights of free men to the freedmen, and who also intended to extend the Bill of Rights 10 the 
slates. See infra Part III. 
47. l BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at • 143.44, 
48. ABBOTT E. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BoNDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND CONVICT LABOR IN 
AME R ICA, 1 607- 1776, al 30-34 (Norton 197 1 )  (1947). 
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ish North America, an armed and universally deputized white population 
was necessary not only to ward off dangers from the armies of other Euro­
pean powers, but also to ward off attacks from the indigenous population 
which feared the encroachment of English settlers on their lands. An armed 
white population was also essential to maintain social control over blacks 
and Indians who toiled unwillingly as slaves and servants in English 
settlements. 49 
This need for racial control helped transform the traditional English right 
into a much broader American one. If English law had qualified the right to 
possess arms by class and religion, American law was much less concerned 
with such distinctions. 50 Initially all Englishmen, and later all white men, 
were expected to possess and bear arms to defend their commonwealths, both 
from external threats and from the internal ones posed by blacks and Indi­
ans. The statutes of many colonies specified that white men be armed at 
public expense. 5 1  In most colonies, all white men between the ages of sixteen 
and sixty, usually with the exception of clergy and religious objectors, were 
considered part of the militia and required to be armed.52 Not only were 
white men required to perform traditional militia and posse duties, they were 
also required to serve as patrollers, a specialized posse dedicated to keeping 
order among the slave population, in those colonies with large slave popula­
tions. 53 This broadening of the right to keep and bear arms reflected a more 
general lessening of class, religious, and ethnic distinctions among whites in 
colonial America. The right to possess arms was, therefore, extended to 
classes traditionally viewed with suspicion in England, including the class of 
indentured servants. 54 
If there were virtually universal agreement concerning the need to arm the 
h. 1 · ss w 1te popu atlon, the law was much more ambivalent with respect to 
49. BooRSTlN, supra note 1 8, at 3SS-56. 
50. Id. at 353. 
5 1 .  See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MA TIER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LF.GAl. 
PROCESS: THE CoLONIAL PERIOD 32 (1978). 
I t  sho�ld
. 
also be added that the abundant game found in North America during the colonial 
pcnod �hmmated the need for the kind of game laws that had traditionally disarmed the lower 
classes m England. Malcolm, supra note 9, at 393.94, 
si.  See. e.g . .  2 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY 1 5-2 1 49 96 1 33 289 (Bernard 
Bush ed., 1977). • • • • 
5 3 .  H1G<J1NBOTHAM, supra note S I ,  at 26()..262. 
54·
t 
For a g� !discussion of the elevation of the rights of white indentured servants as a means of mam
s
ammg soc1
A
a control over the black population, see generally EDMUND S MORGAN AMERI-C A N  I.AVERY, MERICAN fREEDO 
· T Q 
. ' 
55 .  Stephen Halbrook notes tha 
M: �� ' RDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA ( 1 975). 
very concerned that the wid d
t V1rgt.ma s royal government in the late 17th century became csprea practice of carrying a Id d " bell' d 1 hat . a.-; a result, statutes were enacted to 
rms wou ten to 1oment re 10n, an 
H A I . BROOK THAT Evuv M B A 
prevent groups of men from gathering with arms. See 
distinctions 
0
and the need for 
AN 
t 
E �M
l 
ED, supra note 6, at 56-57. The sharpening of racial 
· 
· grea er socia control over slaves that occurred toward the end of the 
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blacks. The progress of slavery in colonial America reflected English lack of 
familiarity with the institution, in both law and custom. 56 In some colonies, 
kidnapped Africans initially were treated like other indentured servants, held 
for a term of years and then released from forced labor and allowed to live as 
free people. 57 In some colonies, the social control of slaves was one of the 
law's major concerns; in others, the issue was largely of private concern to 
the slave owner.58 
These differences were reflected in statutes concerned with the right to 
possess arms and the duty to perform militia service. One colony-Vir­
ginia-provides a striking example of how social changes were reflected, over 
time, in restrictions concerning the right to be armed. A Virginia statute 
. enacted in 1639 required the arming of white men at public expense.59 The 
statute did not specify the arming of black men, but it also did not prohibit 
black men from arming themselves. 60 By 1680 a Virginia statute prohibited 
Negroes, slave and free, from carrying weapons, including clubs.61 Yet, by 
the early eighteenth century, free Negroes who were house owners were per­
mitted to keep one gun in their house, while blacks, slave and free, who lived 
on frontier plantations were able to keep guns. 62 Virginia's experience re­
flected three sets of concerns: the greater need to maintain social control over 
the black population as caste lines sharpened;63 the need to use slaves and 
free blacks to help defend frontier plantations against attacks by hostile Indi­
ans; and the recognition on the part of Virginia authorities of the necessity 
for gun ownership for those living alone. 
These concerns were mirrored in the legislation of other colonies. Massa­
chusetts did not have general legislation prohibiting blacks from carrying 
arms, 64 but free Negroes in that colony were not permitted to participate in 
seventeenth and beginning of the 1 8th century lessened the concern authorities had over the armed 
white population. See MORGAN, supra note 54, at 354-55. 
56. See Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a 
Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 101-102 (1989) (colonies dealt with slavery in an 
unsystematic and piecemeal fashion). See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: 
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 48-52 ( 1968). 
57. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 5 1 , at 2 1-22. . 
58. See HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS (5th ed. 1983); Diamond, 
supra note 56, at 101-102, 104; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Book Review, 56 TuL. 
L. REV. 1 107, 1 1 10- 1 1 12 (1 982) (reviewing A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATIER OF 
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978)). 
59. 1 WILLIAM w. HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE Of VIRGINIA 226 (New York, R. & W. & G. 
Bartow 1 823); see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 51, at 32. 
60. 1 HENING, supra note 59, at 226; see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 5 1 ,  at 32. 
61 .  HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 5 1 , at 39. 
62. Id. at 58 .  
63. Id. at  38-40. 
64. Higginbotham informs us that the Boston selectmen passed such an ordinance after some 
slaves had allegedly committed arson in 1724. See id. at 76. 
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militia drills; instead they were required to perform substitute service on pub­
lic works projects. 6S New Jersey exempted blacks and Indians from militia 
service, though the colony permitted free Negroes to possess firearms.66 
Ironically, South Carolina, which had the harshest slave codes of this period, 
may have been the colony most enthusiastic about extending the right to bear 
arms to free Negroes. With its majority black population, that state's need to 
control the slave population was especially acute.67 To secure free black 
assistance in controlling the slave population, South Carolina in the early 
eighteenth century permitted free blacks the right of suffrage, the right to 
keep firearms, and the right to undertake militia service. 68 As the eighteenth 
century unfolded, those rights were curtailed. 69 
Overall, these laws reflected the desire to maintain white supremacy and 
control. With respect to the right to possess arms, the colonial experience 
had largely eliminated class, religious, and ethnic distinctions among the 
white population. Those who had been part of the suspect classes in Eng­
land-the poor, religious dissenters, and others who had traditionally only 
enjoyed a qualified right to possess arms-found the right to be considerably 
more robust in the American context. But blacks had come to occupy the 
social and legal space of the suspect classes in England. Their right to posses 
arms was highly dependent on white opinion of black loyalty and reliability. 
Their inclusion in the militia of freemen was frequently confined to times of 
crisis. Often, there were significant differences between the way northern and 
65. See LoRENZO J. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 127 (1 968). Greene 
notes that blacks probably served in New England militias until the latter part of the 17th century. 
Id. It is interesting to note that, despite this prohibition on militia service, blacks served with New 
England forces during the French and Indian Wars. Id. at 1 88-89. Winthrop Jordan notes that in 
1652 the Massachusetts General Court ordered Scotsmen, Indians, and Negroes to train with the 
Militia, but that, in 1656, Massachusetts and, in 1660, Connecticut excluded blacks from Militia 
service. See JORDAN, supra note 56, at 7 1 .  
66 .  See 2 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 52, at 49, 96, 289. 
67. For a good discussion of black life in colonial South Carolina, see generally PETER H. 
WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670 THROUGH THE 
STONO REBELLION (1974). 
South Carolina in 1739 was the scene of the Stono Rebellion, one of the largest slave rebellions in 
North America. A recent study of the rebellion suggests that the presence of large numbers of 
African born men from the Kingdom of the Kongo played a critical role. The Kingdom, including 
parts of modern Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and Angola, had been heavily influenced by 
Portugese traders and missionaries in such areas as language, religion, and contemporary European 
military tactics including the use of firearms. The Stono Rebellion illustrated both the internal and 
external threats faced by many colonies. First, the presence of large numbers of African slaves, 
familiar with European military tactics and technology, posed a threat to slave society in South 
Carolina. Second, this threat .was further enhanced by the fact that South Carolina bordered on the 
Spanish colony of Florida. Historical accounts of the rebellion indicate that Portugese-speaking 
Catholic slaves acted in concert with Spanish agents. See generally John K. Thornton, African 
Dimensions of the Stono Rebellion, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 1 10 1  ( 1 99 1 )  
68. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 51 ,  at 201-15. 
69. Id. 
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southern colonies approached this question, a reflection of the very different 
roles that slavery played in the two regions. These differences would become 
sharper after the Revolution, when the northern states began to move toward 
the abolition of slavery and the southern states, some of which had also con­
sidered abolition, 70 began to strengthen the institution. 
Ironically, while the black presence in colonial America introduced a new 
set of restrictions concerning the English law of arms and the militia, it 
helped strengthen the view that the security of the state was best achieved 
through the arming of all free citizens. It was this new view that was part of 
the cultural heritage Americans brought to the framing of the Constitution. 
C. THE RIGHT OF WHICH PEOPLE? 
1 .  Revolutionary Ideals 
The colonial experience helped strengthen the appreciation of early Ameri­
cans for the merits of an armed citizenry. That appreciation was strength­
ened yet further by the American Revolution. If necessity forced the early 
colonists to arm, the Revolution and the friction with Britain's standing 
army that preceded it-and in many ways precipitated it-served to revital­
ize Whiggish notions that standing armies were dangerous to liberty, and 
that militias, composed of the whole of the people, best protected both liberty 
and security. 11  
These notions soon found their way into the debates over the new constitu­
tion, debates which help place the language and meaning of the Second 
Amendment in context. Like other provisions of the proposed constitution, 
the clause that gave Congress the power to provide for the organizing, arm­
ing, and disciplining of the militia 72 excited fears among those who believed 
that the new constitution could be used to destroy both state power and indi­
vidual rights.73 
70. See Robert J. Cottrol, Liberalism and Paternalism: Ideology, Economic Interest and the Busi-
ness Law of Slavery, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 359, 363-64 (1987). 
7 1 .  See generally REID, supra note 34. 
72. That clause is now found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I S. 
73. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts thought a national government which controlled the militia 
would be potentially despotic. James Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention of 1 787 
(Aug. 2 1 ,  1 787), in I 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 9 1 6  (Wilbowin E. Benton, ed., 
1 986). With this power, national government "may enslave the States." Id. at 846. Ohver Ells­
worth of Connecticut suggested that "[t)he whole authority over the Militi� ought by no mcan.s to be taken away from the States whose consequence would pine away to nothing after such a sacnficc 
of power." Id. at 909. 
It is interesting, in light of the current debate, that both advocates and opponents of this increase 
in federal power assumed that the militia they were discussing would be one that e�rolled almost all 
of the white male population between the ages of 16 and 60, and that that ���la�!on wo�ld supply 
their own arms. George Mason of Virginia proposed "the idea of a select m1ht1a, but withdrew 1t. 
Id. at 909. 
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Indeed, it was the very universality of the militia that was the source of 
some of the objections. A number of critics of the proposed constitution 
feared that the proposed congressional power could subject the whole popu­
lation to military discipline and a clear threat to individual liberty .74 Others 
complained that the Militia Clause provided no exemptions for those with 
religious scruples against bearing arms. 75 
But others feared that the Militia Clause could be used to disarm the popu­
lation as well as do away with the states' control of the militia. Some critics 
expressed fear that Congress would use its power to establish a select militia, 
a group of men specially trained and armed for militia duty, similar to the 
earlier English experience. 76 Richard Henry Lee of Virginia argued that that 
select militia might be used to disarm the population and that, in any event, 
it would pose more of a danger to individual liberty than a militia composed 
of the whole population. He charged that a select militia "commits the many 
to the mercy and the prudence of the few."77 A number of critics objected to 
giving Congress the power to arm the militia, fearing that such power would 
likewise give Congress the power to withhold arms from the militia. 78 At the 
constitutional convention, Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry saw such 
potential danger in giving the new government power over the militia, that 
he declared: 
This power in the United States as explained is making the states drill ser­
geants. He had as lief let the citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed, as to 
take the command from the states, and subject them to the General Legis­
lature. It would be regarded as a system of Despotism. 79 
The fear that this new congressional authority could be used to both destroy 
state power over the militia and to disarm the people led delegates to state 
ratifying conventions to urge measures that would preserve the traditional 
74. This was a view argued by Luther Martin before the Maryland House of Representatives. 
�uther Martin Before the Maryland House of Representatives ( 1 787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEOE�AL- CONVENTION OF 1 787, at 1 57 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter THE RECORDS OF 
THI' FEDf.RAl. 
.
co�VENTION). Samuel Bryan, a Pennsylvania pamphleteer who argued against the 
proposed const1tut1on, argued that it could subject the whole population to military discipline. Sa­
muel Br: an, letter to the People of Pennsylvania, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Oct. S, 1 787' re­
printed m THE ANT�F�DERALISTS 22-23, 27 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966). A number of critics 
argued that the prov1s1on was a threat to the liberty of every man from 16 to 60. Id. at 57. Thus, 
the
. 
l�nguage of the �ifth Amendment requiring grand jury proceedings for cases arising in the 
mahtaa, except when m actual service during time of war or public danger, may have been in re­
sponse to this fear. 
7s. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 74, at 57. This concern was the reason for the original language of the Second Amendment. See supra note 4. 
76. Stt supra text accompanying note 43. 
;�- THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 74, at 228. 
272. ·2;5�H
F. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 385-87; 3 id. at 208-09, 
79. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 385. 
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right. The Virginia convention proposed language that would provide pro­
tection for the right to keep and bear arms in the federal constitution. 80 
In their efforts to defend the proposed constitution, Alexander Hamilton 
and James Madison addressed these charges. Hamilton's responses are inter­
esting because he wrote as someone openly skeptical of the value of the mili­
tia of the whole. The former Revolutionary War artillery officer8t expressed 
the view that, while the militia fought bravely during the Revolution, it had 
proven to be no match when pitted against regular troops. Hamilton, who 
Madison claimed initially wanted to forbid the states from controlling any 
land or naval forces, 82 called for uniformity in organizing and disciplining of 
the militia under national authority. He also urged the creation of a select 
militia that would be more amenable to the training and discipline he saw as 
necessary. 83 In what was perhaps a concession to sentiment favoring the 
militia of the whole, Hamilton stated: "Little more can be reasonably aimed 
at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and 
equipped; and in order to see that this not be neglected, it will be necessary to 
assemble them once or twice in the course of a year."84 
If Hamilton gave only grudging support to the concept of the militia of the 
whole, Madison, author of the Second Amendment, was a much more vigor­
ous defender of the concept. He answered critics of the Militia Clause provi­
sion allowing Congress to arm the militia by stating that the term "arming" 
meant only that Congress's authority to arm extended only to prescribing the 
type of arms the militia would use, not to furnishing them. 85 But Madison's 
80. The Virginia convention urged the adoption of the following language: 
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, com­
posed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence for 
a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore 
ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will 
admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and 
governed by, the civil power. 
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1 787 
TOGETH E R  WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 657-59 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
Ayer Co. 1 987) ( 1907) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] . 
8 1 .  RICHARD B. MORRIS, SEVEN WHO SHAPED OUR DESTINY: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AS 
R EVOLUTIONARIES 228, 237-49 (1973). 
82. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 293. 
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 1 6 1  (Alexander Hamilton) (The Heritage Press 1945). For a 
modern study that supports Hamilton's views concerning the military ineffectiveness of the militia, 
see BOORSTIN, supra note 18, at 352-72. 
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 1 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Heritage Press 1945). Interest· 
ingly enough, Hamilton's views anticipated the state of modern law on t�is _subj�ct! th� Natio��I Guard has, in effect, become a select militia with a much larger reserve m1htta ex1stmg m the c1t1· 
zenry at large. 
85. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 80, at 464-65. 
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views went further. He envisioned a militia consisting of virtually the entire 
white male population, writing that a militia of 500,000 citizens86 could pre­
vent any excesses that might be perpetrated by the national government and 
its regular army. Madison left little doubt that he envisioned the militia of 
the whole as a potential counterweight to tyrannical excess on the part of the 
government: 
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; 
and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it 
would not be going too far to say, that the State governments with the 
people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest 
number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can 
be carried in any country does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole 
number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. 
This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army more than 
twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia 
amounting to near half a million citizens with arms in their hands, officered 
by men chosen among themselves, fighting for their common liberties and 
united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confi­
dence. It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could 
ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are 
best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against 
the British arms will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides 
the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the peo­
ple of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, 
to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are ap­
pointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insur­
mountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. 
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of 
Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the. . . 
governments are afraid to trust the people with arms . . . .  B7 
It is against this background that the meaning of the Second Amendment 
must be considered. For the revolutionary generation, the idea of the militia 
an
_
d
_ 
�n armed population were related. The principal reason for pref erring a 
m1ht1a of the whole over either a standing army or a select militia was rooted 
�n t�e �dea that, whatever the inefficiency of the militia of the whole, the 
mst1tut1on would better protect the newly won freedoms than a reliance on 
security provided by some more select body. 
116· THF. FF.OEll�LIST No. 46, at 3 1 9  (James Madison) (The Heritage Press 1 945). The census of I 790 h5ted the white male population over age 16 as 8 1 3  298 " B c u S DrP'T OF Co , . Jee UREAU OF THE ENSUS, . .  . MMF.RCE, STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THF. PRFSf.NT 16 ( 1 976) Th d"d 1. 
f . . . 
· e census t not 1st the number over 60 that would have been exempt rom mahtta duty. 
87. Id. 
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2. Racial Limitations 
One year after the ratification of the Second Amendment and the Bill of 
Rights, Congress passed legislation that reaffirmed the notion of the militia of 
the whole and explicitly introduced a racial component into the national de­
liberations on the subject of the militia. The Uniform Militia Act88 called for 
the e nrollment of every free, able-bodied white male citizen between the ages 
of eighteen and forty-five into the militia. The act further specified that every 
militia member was to provide himself with a m usket or firelock, a bayonet, 
and ammunition. 
This specification of a racial qualification for militia membership was 
somewhat at odds with general practice in the late eighteenth century. De­
spite its recognition and sanctioning of slavery, 89 the Constitution had no 
racial definition of citizenship. 90 Free Negroes voted in a majority of states. 91 
A number of states had militia provisions that allowed free Negroes to par­
ticipate. 92 Particularly in the northern states, many were well aware that free 
Negroes and former slaves had served with their state forces during the 
Revolution.93 Despite the prejudices of the day, lawmakers in late eight­
eenth-century America were significantly less willing to write racial restric­
tions into constitutions and other laws guaranteeing fundamental rights than 
were their counterparts a generation or so later in the nineteenth century. 94 
The 1 792 statute restricting militia enrollment to white men was one of the 
earliest federal statutes to make a racial distinction. 
The significance of this restriction is not altogether clear. For the South, 
there was a clear desire to have a militia that was reliable and could be used 
to suppress potential slave insurrections. But despite the fear that free Ne­
groes might make common cause with slaves, and despite federal law, some 
southern states in the antebellum period enrolled free blacks as militia mem-
88. I Stat. 27 1 .  
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I ,  § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths of slave population counted for apportionment 
purposes); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I (importation of slaves allowed until 1 808); U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 2, cl. 3 (escaped slaves must be "delivered up" to their masters). 
90. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3 (specifying congressional representation) is often cited for the 
proposition that blacks were not citizens because of the three-fifths clause. It should be noted that, 
under this clause, free Negroes were counted as whole persons for purposes of representation. The 
original wording of this provision specifically mentioned "white and other citizens," but that lan­
guage was deleted by the committee on style as redundant. See 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 
78, at 45 1 . 
9 1 .  See infra Part II; see also Robert J. Cottrol, A Tale of Two Cultures: Or Making the Proper 
Connections Between Law, Social History and The Political Economy of Despair, 25 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 989, 1004 & nn. 86-88 ( 1988). 
92. JORDAN, supra note 56, at 1 25-26, 41 1 - 1 2. . 
93. Robert J. Cottrol, Law, Politics and Race in Urban America: Towards a New Synthesis, 1 7  
RUTGERS L.J. 483, 503 & n. 1 29 ( 1 986). . . . 
94. Robert J. Cottrol, The Thirteenth Amendment and the North 's Overlooked Ega/uanan 1!en­
tage, 1 1  NAT'L BLACK L.J. 198, 202-03 ( 1989) (discussing racism in early 19th-century Amenca). 
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bers. 9s Northern states at various times also enrolled free Negroes in the 
militia despite federal law and often strident prejudice.96 States North and 
South employed free Negroes in state forces during times of invasion.97 
While southern states often prohibited slaves from carrying weapons and 
strictly regulated access to firearms by free Negroes,98 northern states gener­
ally made no racial distinction with respect to the right to own firearms,99 
and federal law was silent on the subject. 
The racial restriction in the 1792 statute indicates the unrest the revolu­
tionary generation felt toward arming blacks and perhaps the recognition 
that one of the functions of the militia would indeed be to put down slave 
revolts. Yet, the widespread use of blacks as soldiers in time of crisis and the 
absence of restrictions concerning the arming of blacks in the northern states 
may provide another clue concerning how to read the Second Amendment. 
The 1 792 act specified militia enrollment for white men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five. 100 Yet, while it specifically included only this limited 
portion of the population, the statute excluded no one from militia service. 
The authors of the statute had experience, in the Revolution, with a militia 
and Continental Army considerably broad in membership. Older and 
younger men had served with the Revolutionary forces. Blacks had served, 
though their service had been an object of considerable controversy. 101 Even 
women had served, though, given the attitudes of the day, this was far more 
controversial than black service. Given this experience and the fact that the 
constitutional debates over the militia had constantly assumed an enrollment 
of the male population between sixteen and sixty, it is likely that the framers 
of the 1 792 statute envisioned a militia even broader than the one they speci­
fied. This suggests to us how broad the term "people" in the Second Amend­
ment was meant to be. 
The 1 792 statute also suggests to us also how crucial race has been in our 
95._ See JORDAN s
.
upra note 56, at 125-26, 411-12 (in varying degrees, North Carolina, South 
Carohna, and Georgia); BERNARD c. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLACK 
A M ERICANS IN THE MILITARY 20 (1986) (same). 
96. See JORDAN, supra note 56, at 125-26 ("Although [the exclusion of Negroes from the militia] 
lay on the s�atute books of all four New England colonies, Negroes served in New England forces in 
every colonial war " Additionally d · · d · 
. 
· • an m varymg egrees, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvama, 
and Delaware tncluded Negroes.). 
97· This was particularly true during the War of 1812. See ROBERT J COTIROL THE AFRO­y AN KEES: PROVIDENCE'S BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE ANTEBELLUM ER� 63 (1982)'. EUGENE D. 
GENOVESE. Rou, JORDON, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 1 55 (1976)- NALTY supra 
note 95. at 24-28. • 
' 
:
�
· 
;ee :n.r:�a Part II.A; see also STAMPP, supra note 27, at 208-28. 
I 
·.., au
h 
1 7tn
R
kelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebel-um nort . UTGERS l.J. 415, 476 (1986). 
100. See supra note 88. 
I O I .  NALTY. supra note 95 at 10- 1 8  S 
A R 
• 
· ee generally BENJAMIN QUARLES THE NEGRO IN THE MERICAN EVOLUTION (196 ) ). ' 
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history. If the racial distinction made in that statute was somewhat anoma­
lous in the late eighteenth century, it was the kind of distinction that would 
become more common in the nineteenth. The story of blacks and arms 
would continue in the nineteenth century as racial distinctions became 
sharper and the defense of slavery more militant. 
II. ARMS AND THE ANTEBELLUM EXPERIENCE 
If, as presaged by the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, 102 racial distinctions 
became sharper in the nineteenth century, that development was at odds with 
the rhetoric of the Revolution and with developments of the immediate post­
revolutionary era. 103 Flush with the precepts of egalitarian democracy, 
America had entered a time of recognition and expansion of rights. Eleven 
of the thirteen original states, as well as Vermont, passed new constitutions 
in the period between 1 776 and 1777 . 104 Five of these states rewrote their 
constitutions by the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1 79 1 .  10� A 
twelfth original state, Massachusetts, passed a new constitution in 1 780. 106 
Many of the new constitutions recognized the status of citizens as "free and 
equal" or "free and independent."107 In Massachusetts and Vermont, these 
clauses were interpreted as outlawing the institution of slavery. 108 Many of 
the new constitutions guaranteed the right to vote regardless of race to all 
men who otherwise qualified, 109 and guaranteed many of the rights that 
102. 1 Stat. 27 1; see supra note 88. 
103. See Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana 's Racial Classifi­
cation Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Lov. L. REV. 255, 260-63 (1983). 
104. See FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Benjamin P. Poore ed., 2d ed., Washington, Government Printing 
Office 1878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS}. Massachusetts passed a new con­
stitution in 1 780. I id. at 956. Rhode Island would not do so until 1 842. 2 id. at 1603. 
1 05. These states were: Georgia in 1 789, see 1 id. at 384; New Hampshire in 1784, see 2 id. at 
1 280; Pennsylvania in 1 790, see 2 id. at I 548; South Carolina in 1 778 and 1780, see 2 id. at 1620, 
1 628; and Vermont in 1786, see 2 id. at 1866. 
1 06. I id. at 956. 
107. See N.H. CONST. of 1 784, pt. I, art. I, 2 FEDERAL A N D  STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
1 04, at 1 280; CONN. CONST. of 1 776, pmbl., I FEDERAL A N D  STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
104, at 257; MASS. CONST. of 1 780, pt. I, art. I, I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 104, at 957; PA. CONST. of 1 776, declaration of rights, art. I, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI­
TUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 54 1 ;  PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § I. 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CON­
STITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 554; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. I, 2 FEDERAL A N D  STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1 04, at 1867; VT. CONST. of 1 776, bill of rights, § I, 2 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104. at 1908. 
108. See Diamond, supra note 56, at !03 nn.59-6 1 .  
1 09. See, e.g. , GA. CONST. of 1 779, art. IV, § I ,  I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, .rupra 
note 104, at 386; Mo. CONST. OF 1 776, art. II, I FEDERAL A N D  STATE CONSTITUTIONS. supra note 
1 04, at 82 1 ;  MASS. CONST. of 1 776, pt. I. declaration of rights, art. IX, I FEDERAL AND STATF. 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1 04, at 958; N.H. CONST. OF 1 784. pt. I. bill of rights. art. XI. 2 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 28 1 ;  N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. IV. 2 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 3 1 1 ; N.C. CONST. of 1776. constitution 
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would later be recognized in the Bill of Rights. 1 10 In no instance were any of 
these rights limited only to the white population; several states explicitly ex­
tended rights to the entire population irrespective of race. 1 1 1  
The right to vote, perhaps the most fundamental of rights, was limited in 
almost all instances to men who met property restrictions, but in most states 
was not limited according to race. 1 12 Ironically, only in the nineteenth-cen­
tury would black voting rights be curtailed, as Jacksonian democracy ex­
panded voting rights for whites. 1 1 3 In its constitution of 1 82 1 ,  New York 
eliminated a one hundred dollar property requirement for white males, and 
concomitantly increased the requirement to two hundred fifty dollars for 
or frame of government, art. IX, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 141 1-
12; PA. CONST. of 1 776, declaration of rights, art. VII, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 104, at 1 541; VT. CONST. of 1 777, ch. 1 ,  declaration of rights, art. VIII, 2 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1859. 
Only Georgia, under its 1776 constitution, and South Carolina, in its 1790 constitution, provided 
explicit racial restrictions on the right to vote. See GA. CONST. of 1 776, art. IX, 1 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 379; s.c. CONST. of 1 790, art. I § 4, 2 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1628. 
1 10. See, e.g. , GA. CONST. of 1 776, art. LXI, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 104, at 283 (freedom of the press); MASS. CONST. of 1 780, pt. l,  declaration of rights, art. 
XVIII, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 959 (freedom of assembly); 
Mo. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XXVII, 2 FEDERAL AND ST ATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 104, at 8 1 9  (prohibiting quartering troops in homes); N.H. CONST. of 1 776, declaration 
of rights, art. XXIII, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 959 (limits on 
searches and seizures and on general warrants); PA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XII, 
2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 542 (freedom of speech); s.c. CONST. 
of 1 778, art. XLI, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 627 (due process of 
law); VA. CONST. of 1776, bill of rights, § 16, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
104, at 1 909 (freedom of religion); VT. CONST. of 1 786, ch. 1 ,  declaration of rights, art. XVIII, 2 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 869 (right to bear arms). 
1 1 1 . See GA. CONST. of 1776, art. LVI, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
104, at 283; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
104, at 386; Mo. CONST. of 1 776, art. XXXIII, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 104, at 8 19-20 (freedom of religion for "all persons"); N.C. CONST. of 1 776, art. VIII (rights in 
criminal proceedings to be informed of charges, to confront witnesses, and to remain silent for 
"every man," and freedom of religion for "all men"), 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 104, at 1409; N.Y. CoNST. of 1 777, art. XIII (due process to be denied "no member of 
this state"), art. XXXVIII (freedom of religion "to all mankind"); PA.CONST. of 1776, art. II (free­
dom of religion for "all men"), art. VIII (due process for "every member of society"), 2 FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1 04, at 1 54 1 ;  PA. CONST. of 1 790, art. XI, § 3 (freedom of 
religion to be denied to "no person"), art. XI, § 7 (freedom of the press for "every person" and 
freedom of speech for "every citizen"), art. XI, § 1 0  (due process to be denied to "no person"), 2 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 5 54-55; s.c. CONST. of 1 778, art. 
XXXVIII (freedom of religion), 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1626-
27; s.c. CONST. of 1 790, art. VIII (freedom of religion "to all mankind"), 2 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, § supra note 104, at 1632. 
1 12. See COTTROL, supra note 97, at 42-43. 
1 1 3 . See Cottrol, supra note 93, at 508-09. This is not to say that voting limitations were the sole 
measure of the failure of Jacksonian democracy to include blacks. Id. at 508- 1 3 . 
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blacks. 1 14 Other states would eliminate black voting rights altogether. • t s  
Other than Maine, no state admitted to the union in the nineteenth century's 
antebellum period allowed blacks to vote. 1 16  
This curtailment of black voting rights was part and parcel of a certain 
hostility toward free blacks, a hostility that ran throughout the union of 
states. In northern states, where slavery had been �bandoned or was not a 
serious factor in social or economic relations, such hostility was the result of 
simple racism.1 17 In southern states, where slavery was an integral part of 
the social and economic framework, this hqstility was occasioned b y  the 
threat that free blacks posed to the system of Negro slavery.1 1 s 
A. THE SOUTHERN ANTEBELLUM EXPERIENCE: CONTROL OF ARMS AS A 
MEANS OF RACIAL OPPRESSION 
The threat that free blacks posed to southern slavery was twofold. First, 
free blacks were a bad example to slaves. For a slave to see free blacks enjoy 
the trappings of white persons-freedom of movement, expression, and asso­
ciation, relative freedom from fear for one's person and one's family, and 
freedom to own the fruits of one's labor-was to offer hope and raise desire 
for that which the system could not produce. A slave with horizons limited 
only to a continued existence in slavery was a slave who did not threaten the 
system, 1 19 whereas a slave with visions of freedom threatened rebellion. 
This threat of rebellion is intimately related to the second threat that free 
blacks posed to the system of Negro slavery, the threat that free blacks might 
instigate or participate in a rebellion by their slave brethren. To forestall this 
threat of rebellion, southern legislatures undertook to limit the freedom of 
1 1 4. N.Y. CONST. of 1821,  art. II, superceding N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VII; see also Dixon R. 
Fox, The Negro Vote in Old New York. in FREE BLACKS IN AMERICA, 1800-1860, at 95, 97-1 12 
(John H. Bracey, Jr. et. al. eds., 1 970). 
1 1 5. See COTIROL, supra note 97, at 42-43. 
1 1 6. LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790- 1 860, 
at 7 9  ( 1961). 
1 1 7 . It is to be questioned whether racism is ever "simple." Winthrop Jordan has theorized that 
the English and their cultural descendants were culturally predisposed to racism. JORDAN, supra 
note 56, at 3- 43. Carl Jung has suggested that for white Americans the Negro represents the part of 
the unconscious that requires repression. ALEXANDER THOMAS & SAMUEL SILLEN, RACISM AND 
PSYCHIATRY 13-14 (1972); ''America Facing its Most Tragic Moment"-Dr. Carl Jung, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1912, § 5, at 3. Whatever accounts for racism, it is clear that racism is capable of 
actuating the lawmaking process. See generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 51. 
1 1 8. See STAMPP, supra note 27, at 2 1 5-17. 
1 19. Compare "Sambo," the idealized exposition of the slave psyche hypothesized by Stanley 
Elkins. Elkins viewed slaves as having internalized their circumstances to the point at which they 
became not only incapable of resisting the white masters but also actively cooperated in maintaining 
their own degradation. See STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITU· 
TIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 8 1 - 1 39 (3d ed., 1976). 
336 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:309 
movement and decision of free blacks. 120 States limited the number of free 
blacks who might congregate at one time; 121 they curtailed the ability of free 
blacks to choose their own employment, 122 and to trade and socialize with 
slaves. 123 Free blacks were subject to question, to search, and to summary 
punishment by patrols established to keep the black population, slave and 
free, in order. 12• To forestall the possibility that free blacks would rebel 
either on their own or with slaves, the southern states limited not only the 
right of slaves, but also the right of free blacks,  to bear arms. 125 
The idea was to restrict the availability of arms to blacks, both slave and 
free, to the extent consistent with local conceptions of safety. At one extreme 
was Texas, which, between 1 842 and 1850, prohibited slaves from using fire­
arms altogether. 126 Also at this extreme was Mississippi, which forbade fire­
arms to both free blacks and slaves after 1852. 127 At the other extreme was 
Kentucky, which merely provided that, should slaves or free blacks "wilfully 
and maliciously" shoot at a white person, or otherwise wound a free white 
person while attempting to kill another person, the slave or free black would 
suffer the death penalty. 12s 
· 
More often than not, slave state statutes restricting black access to firearms 
were aimed primarily at free blacks, as opposed to slaves, perhaps because 
the vigilant master was presumed capable of denying arms to all but the most 
trustworthy slaves, and would give proper supervision to the latter. 129 Thus, 
1 20. GENOVESE, supra note 97, at 51 ,  399; STAMPP, supra note 27, at 2 1 5-217; Eugene D. Geno­
vese, The Slave States of North America, in NEITHER SLAVE NOR FREE: THE FREEDMEN OF AFRI­
CAN DESCENT IN THE SLAVE SocIETIES OF THE NEW WORLD 258, 2 6 1-262 (David w. Cohen & 
Jack P. Greene eds., 1972). 
1 2 1 .  JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 
1 39. 40 (6th ed. 1988). 
122. Id. at 140. 
1 23.  Id. at 140-41. 
1 24. STAMPP, supra note 27, at 2 14-16. 
1 25 .  See infra text accompanying notes 126-46. 
1 26. An A�t Concerning Slaves, § 6, 1840 Laws of Tex. 1 7 1 ,  1 72. Chapter 58 of the Texas Acts 
�I 850
r
rovided penalties for violators of the 1840 statute. Act of Dec. 3, 1850, ch. 5 8, § l ,  1 850 
w5 0 ex. 42-44 (amending § 6 of An Act Concerning Slaves). Masters overseers or employers 
were to be fined between S25 and $ 1 00, and the slave was to receive not l�s than 39 �or more than 
50 lashes. But also under the 1 850 Act, slaves were allowed to carry firearms on the premises of the 
master, oversrer, or employer, where they presumably would receive proper supervision. 
. 
1 2  7 · Act of Mar. 1 5, 1852, ch. 206, 1 852 Laws of Miss. 328 {prohibiting magistrates from issuing 
hcense:i f�r .bla.cks to carry and use firearms). This act repealed Chapter 73 sections 1 0  and 1 2 of 
the Mississippi Acts of 1822, allowing slaves and free blacks respectively to ;btain a license to carry fire.arms. See Act of June 18, 1 822, ch. 73, §§ 10, 12, 1 822 Laws of Miss. 179 1 8 1 -82. 1 28. Chapter 448 § 1 ofth K t k A f · · ' f 
Feb. 10. 1 8 1 9. ch 448 
'§ 1 1� 1 9
en
A
u
t
c Y
f K
cts o 1818  was hm1ted solely to slave offenders. Act o 
. . 
· • • c s  o Y · 787. The Kentucky Acts of 1850 extended these �5
1
1�ns to free blacks as well. Act of Mar. 24, 185 1 ,  ch. 617,  art. VII, § 7, 1 850 Acts of Ky. 29 1 . 
f 1fi29· This pres
! 
umption was not dispositive of all regulation on this subject. Sale or other delivery 0 rearms to s aves was forbidden b I d Y severa states, among them Florida, Georgia, Louisiana. an 
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Louisiana provided that a slave was denied the use of firearms and all other 
offensive weapons, 1 30 unless the slave carried written permission to hunt 
within the boundaries of the owner's plantation. 1 3 1  South Carolina prohib­
ited slaves outside the company of whites or without written permission from 
their master from using or carrying firearms unless they were hunting or 
guarding the master's plantation. 132 Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia did 
not statutorily address the question of slaves' access to firearms, perhaps be­
cause controls inherent to the system made such laws unnecessary in these 
states' eyes. 
By contrast, free blacks, not under the close scrutiny of whites, were gener­
ally subject to tight regulation with respect to firearms. The State of Florida, 
which had in 1 824 provided for a weekly renewable license for slaves to use 
firearms to hunt and for "any other necessary and lawful purpose,"133 turned 
its attention to the question of free blacks in 1825. Section 8 of "An Act to 
Govern Patrols"134 provided that white citizen patrols "shall enter into all 
negro houses and suspected places, and search for arms and other offensive 
or improper weapons, and may lawfully seize and take away all such arms, 
weapons, and ammunition . . . .  " By contrast, the following section of that 
same statute expanded the conditions under which a slave might carry a fire­
arm, a slave might do so under this statute either by means of the weekly 
renewable license or if "in the presence of some white person."13s 
Florida went back and forth on the question of licenses for free blacks 1 36 
but, in  February 1831 repealed all provision for firearm licenses for free 
North Carolina. Act of Feb 25, 1 840, no. 20, § l ,  1840 Acts of Fla. 22-23; Act of Dec. 19, 1860, no. 
64, § 1, 1 860 Acts of Ga. 561; Act of Apr. 8, 1 8 1 1, ch. 14, 1 8 1 1 Laws ofl,a. 50, 53-54; Act of Jan. 1 ,  
1 845, ch. 87, §§  1 ,  2, 1 845 Acts of N.C. 1 24. Moreover, slave states often provided for patrols 
manned by local men who would be authorized to search out and confiscate firearms in the posses­
sion of free blacks as well as slaves. See infra text accompanying notes 133-46. 
1 30. Black Code, ch. 33, § 19, Laws of La. 150, 160 (1 806). 
1 3 1 .  Id. § 20. Moreover, in 1 8 1 1 ,  Louisiana forbade peddlers from selling arms to slaves, upon a 
fine of $500 or one year in prison. Act of Apr. 8, 181 1, ch. 14, 1 8 1 1  Laws of La. 50, 53-54 (supple­
menting act relative to peddlers and hawkers). 
132.  Act of Dec. 1 8, 1 8 19, 1 8 1 9  Acts of S.C. 28, 3 1  (providing more effective performance of 
patrol duty). 
1 33.  An Act Concerning Slaves, § 1 1, Acts of Fla. 289, 29 1 (1824). In 1 825, Florida had p�o­
vided a penalty for slaves using firelight to hunt at night, but this seems to have been a po�1ce 
measure intended to preserve wooded land, for whites were also penalized for this offense, albeit a 
lesser penalty. Act of Dec. Io, 1 825,  § 5, 1 825 Laws of Fla. 78-80. Penalties for "fire.h
unting" were 
reenacted in 1 827, Act of Jan. t ,  1 828, 1 828 Laws of Fla. 24-25, and the penalties for a slave 
firehunting were reenacted in 1 828,  Act of Nov. 21, 1 828, § 46, 1 828 Laws of Fla. 174, 1 85.  
1 34. 1 825 Acts of Fla. 52, 55. 
1 35. Id. § 9. 
136. In 1 828, Florida twice enacted provisions providing for free blacks to carry and use firearms 
upon obtaining a license from a justice of the peace. Act of Nov. 1 7, 1 828, § 9, 1828 Fla. Laws 1 74, 
177; Act of Jan. 12, 1828, § 9, 1 827 Fla. Laws 97, 100. 
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blacks. 1 31 This development predated by six months the Nat Turner slave 
revolt in Virginia, which was responsible for the deaths of at least fifty-seven 
white people1Js and which caused the legislatures of the Southern states to 
reinvigorate their repression of free blacks. 1 39 Among the measures that 
slave states took was to further restrict the right to carry and use firearms. 
In its December 183 1  legislative session, Delaware for the first time required 
free blacks desiring to carry firearms to obtain a license from a justice of the 
peace. 140 In their December 1831  legislative sessions, both Maryland141  and 
Virginia 142 entirely prohibited free blacks from carrying arms; Georgia fol­
lowed suit in 1833, declaring that "it shall not be lawful for any free person 
of colour in this state, to own, use, or carry fire arms of any description 
whatever.''143 
Perhaps as a response to the Nat Turner rebellion, Florida in 1 833 enacted 
another statute authorizing white citizen patrols to seize arms found in the 
homes of slaves and free blacks, and provided that blacks without a proper 
explanation for the presence of the firearms be summarily punished, without 
benefit of a judicial tribunal.144 In 1846 and 1 861 ,  the Florida legislature 
provided once again that white citizen patrols might search the homes of 
blacks, both free and slave, and confiscate arms held therein. 145 Yet, search­
ing out arms was not the only role of the white citizen patrols: these patrols 
were intended to enforce pass systems for both slaves and free blacks, to be 
sure that blacks did not possess liquor and other contraband items, and gen­
erally to terrorize blacks into accepting their subordination. 146 The patrols 
would meet no resistance from those who were simply unable to offer any. 
1 37. Act of Jan 31 , 183 1 , 1 8 3 1  Fla. Laws 30. 
1 38. APTHEKER, supra note 58, at 298. For a full account of the revolt the bloodiest in United 
States history, see id. at 293-324. For a compilation of documentary sour�s on the revolt, see also 
H F..NRY l. TRAGLE, THE SoUTHAMPTON SLAVE REVOLT OF EIGHTEEN THIRTY-ONE : A CoMPI-
1.ATION OF SoURCE MATERIAL ( 197 1). An account of the revolt novelized from Turner's confes­
sion can be foun� .i� WILLIAM STYRON, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER ( 1967). Styron's novel h� been cnltctzed as failing to capture the power of religion to the 19th century black, and 
thus failing to tell the truth of the revolt. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. CHEEK, BLACK RESISTANCE 
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 1 16- 1 7  ( 1970). 
1 39. See HERBERT APTHEKER, NAT TURNER'S SLAVE REBELLION 74-94 (1966). 
140. Id. at 74-75. 
1 4 1 .  Id. at 75. 
142. Id. at 81. 
1 43. Act of Dec 23, 1833, § 7, 1 833 Ga. Laws 226, 228. 
h 144· Act of Feb. 17, 1833, ch. 67 1 ,  §§ 1 5, 17, 1833 Fla. Laws 26 29. The black person offending t e statute was to be "severely 
· hed " · 
' 
eed h. . 
pums 
• incongruously enough "by moderate whipping," not to exc t arty·mne strokes on the bare back. Id. § 17. 
§ 1
1�\ 8:�·��-J�
.w�· i:,4�
.
ch. 87, § I I , 1846 Fla. Laws 42, 44; Act of Dec. 17, 1 86 1 ,  ch. 1291 , 
I %. STAMPP, supra note 27, at 2 14- 1 5. 
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B. THE NORTHERN ANTEBELLUM EXPERIENCE: USE OF FIREARMS TO 
COMBAT RACIALLY MOTIVATED DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY 
Even as northern racism defined itself in part by the curtailment of black 
voting rights, 147 it cumulatively amounted to what some have called a wide­
spread "Negrophobia." 148 With notable exceptions, public schooling, if 
available to blacks at all, was segregated. 149 Statutory and constitutional lim­
itations on the freedom of blacks to emigrate into northern states were a 
further measure of northern racism. 150 While the level of enforcement and 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 1 12-16. 
1 48.  See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10 ( 1977). 
149. After Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 ( 1 849), upheld the provision of segregated 
public education in the City of Boston, the Massachusetts legislature outlawed segregated educa­
tion. Act of Mar. 24, 1 855, ch. 256, 1 855 Mass. Acts 256; see Finkelman, supra note 99, at 465-467. 
In Connecticut, most schools were integrated before 1830; only in response to a request from the 
Hartford black community was a separate system established in that year. Id. at 468. The Iowa 
constitution provided for integration in public schools. See Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 
266 (1 868) (construing IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. IX, § 12). 
In Ohio, blacks were excluded entirely from public schools until 1834 when the state Supreme 
Court ruled that children of mixed black ancestry who were more than half white might attend; not 
until 1 848 did the legislature provide for public education of any sort for other black children. 
Williams v. Directors of Sch. Dist., Ohio 578 (1834); see also Lane v. Baker, 12 Ohio 237 (1 843). In 
1 848, the state legislature allowed blacks to be serviced by the public schools unless whites in the 
community were opposed; in the alternative, the legislature provided for segregated education. Act 
of Feb. 24, 1 848, 1848 Ohio Laws 8 1 .  The following year, the legislature provided that the choice of 
segregated or integraied public education lie at the option of local school districts. Act of Feb. 10, 
1 849, 1849 Ohio Laws 17. Cincinnati refused to comply with the mandate to educate blacks until 
forced to do so by a combination of statutory and judicial persuasion. Act of Mar. 14, 1853, § 3 1 ,  
1 853 Ohio Laws 429; Act of Apr. 1 8, 1 854, 1854 Ohio Laws 48; Act of Apr. 8, 1856, 1 856 Ohio 
Laws 1 17; State ex rel. Directors of the E. & W. Sch. Dist. v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 1 78 
( 1 850); see Finkelman, supra note 99, at 468-470. See generally UNITED STATES OFFICE OF EDU­
CATION, HISTORY OF SCHOOLS FOR THE COLORED POPULATION (1969). In Philadelphia, public 
education was provided for whites in 1 8 1 8, and separate education was provided for blacks in 1 822. 
Finkelman, supra note 99, at 468. In Providence, public education was segregated. COTTROL, 
supra note 1 1 1 ,  at 90. Rural schools in Rhode Island, however, were integrated. Id. In New York, 
some school districts were segregated, among them that of New York City. Finkelman, supra note 
99, at 463, 467-68. 
1 50. From 1807 to 1849, Ohio required blacks entering the state to post a bond. Act of Jan. 25, 
1 807, ch. VIII, 1807 Ohio Gen. Assem. Laws 53, repealed by Act of Feb. 10, 1849, 1849 Ohio Laws 
1 7. Michigan Territory passed a similar law in 1827, though there was only one r�rded attempt 
to enforce it. Act of Apr 13, 1 827, 1827 Mich. Rev. Laws 1-10 (1st & 2d Councils). DAVID M. 
KATZMAN, BEFORE THE GHETTO: BLACK DETROIT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 7 n.6 ( 1973). 
Indiana required a bond from 1 83 1  until 1851,  when a new constitution forbade black immigration 
entirely. Act of Feb. 10, 1831,  1 83 1  Ind. Rev. Laws 375, superseded by IND. CONST. of 1 8 5 1 ,  art. 
XIII, § 1 (amended 1881). Illinois went the same route by coupling the repeal of its 1829 bond 
provisions with a prohibition on black immigration in its 1 848 constitution. ILL. CONST. of 1 848, 
art. XIV; Act of Jan. 1 7, 1832-33, Ill. Rev. Laws 463, amended by Act of Feb 1,  183 1 ,  1832-33 Ill. 
Rev. Laws 462, repealed by Act of Feb. 12, 1853, 1853 Ill. Laws 57. Oregon's 1859 constitution 
forbade blacks to enter the state, OR. CONST. of 1859, art. XVIII (repealed 1926), and Iowa pro­
vided for a fine of two dollars a day for any black remaining in the state for more than three days. 
Act of Feb. 5, 1851, 1851 Iowa Laws 1 72. 
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the ultimate effect of these constitutional and statutory provisions may not 
have been great, 15 1 the very existence of these laws speaks to the level of 
hostility northern whites had for blacks during this period. It is against this 
background-if not poisonous, racist and hostile-that the black antebellum 
experience with the right to bear arms must be measured. 
Perhaps nothing makes this point better than the race riots and mob vio­
lence against blacks that occurred in many northern cities in the antebellum 
period. These episodes also illustrate the uses to which firearms might be put 
in pursuit of self-defense and individual liberty. 
A good deal of racial tension was generated by economic competition be­
tween whites and blacks during this period, and this tension accounts in part 
for violent attacks against blacks. 1 52 Moreover, whites were able to focus 
their attacks because blacks were segregated into distinct neighborhoods in 
northern states, rendering it easy for white mobs to find the objects of their 
hostility. 153 
Quite often, racial violence made for bloody, destructive confrontations. 
In July 1834, mobs in New York attacked churches, homes, and businesses 
of white abolitionists and blacks. These mobs were estimated at upwards of 
twenty thousand people and required the intervention of the militia to sup­
press. 1 54 In Boston in August of 1 843, after a handful of white sailors ver­
bally and physically assaulted four blacks who defended themselves, a mob 
of several hundred whites attacked and severely beat every black they could 
find, dispersed only by the combined efforts of police and fire personnel. 155 
The Providence Snowtown Riot of 1 83 1  was precipitated by a fight be­
tween whites and blacks at "some houses of ill fame"l56 located in the black 
ghetto of Snowtown. After a mob of one hundred or so whites descended on 
Snowtown, and after warning shots had been fired, a black man fired into the 
crowd, killing a white. The mob then descended on Snowtown in earnest, 
destroying no fewer than seventeen black occupied dwellings across a period 
of four days. The mobs did not disperse until the militia fired into the crowd, 
killing four men and wounding fourteen others. 1 51 
1 5 1 .  From 1833 to 1 838, Connecticut prohibited the establishment of schools for nonresident 
blacks. Act of May 24, 1 833, ch. IX, 1833 Conn. Pub. Acts 425, repealed by Act of May 3 1 ,  1 838, 
ch. XXXIV, 1838 Conn. Pub. Acts 30; see also Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 ( 1 834) (attempted 
prosecution under this statute failed due to an insufficient information). See Finkelman, supra note 
99, at 430-43 (discussing the lack of enforcement of statutes regulating black immigration). 
1 52. See LITWACK, supra note 1 16, at 1 59, 1 65 (in fields where blacks were allowed to compete 
with whites, who were often the new Irish immigrants, violence often erupted). 
1 53. Id. at 1 53; see also LEONARD P. CURRY, THE FREE BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA 1 800-
1 850: THE SHADOW OF THE DREAM 96- 1 1 1  (198 1). 
1 54. CURRY, supra note 1 53, at 1 0 1 .  
1 55. Id. at 100. 
1 56. Id. at 102. 
1 57. Id. at 102-03. 
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Similarly, the militia in Philadelphia put down an October 1849 race riot 
that resulted in three deaths, injuries, and the destruction of property. 1ss By 
contrast, in the Providence Hardscrabble Riot of October 1824, militia were 
not called out and the police did nothing to stop a crowd of fifty or so whites 
from destroying every house in the black Hardscrabble area and looting 
household goods. 1 s9 
Awareness of racial hostility generally, and of incidents like these, made 
blacks desirous of forming militia units. The firing of the weapon in Provi­
dence in 1 831  that sparked the mob to violence illustrated that blacks were 
willing to take up arms to protect themselves, but also illustrated the poten­
tially counterproductive nature of individual action. The actions of the white 
militia in Providence and Philadelphia, as well as those of the police and fire 
units in Boston, proved the strength of collective armed action against mob 
violence. Moreover, the failure of police to take action in Providence in 1 824 
illustrated the vulnerability of the black community to mob violence, absent 
protection. 
Though the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 had not specifically barred blacks 
from participation in the state organized militia, 160 the northern states had 
treated the act as such, and so the state organized militia was not an op­
tion. 161 Blacks could nonetheless form private militia groups that might 
serve to protect against racial violence, and did so. Free blacks in Providence 
formed the African Greys in 1 821 .  162 Oscar Handlin tells of an attempt by 
black Bostonians in the 1 850s to form a private militia company. 163 Black 
members of the Pittsburgh community had no private militia but nonetheless 
took action against a mob expected to riot in April 1839. Instead of taking 
action on their own, they joined an interracial peacekeeping force proposed 
by the city's mayor, and were able to put a stop to the riot. 164 
It  is not clear whether private black militia groups ever marched on a 
white mob. But that they may never have been called on to do so may be a 
measure of their success. The story of the July 1 835 Philadelphia riot is 
illustrative. Precipitated when a young black man assaulted a white one, the 
two day riot ended without resort to military intervention when a rumor 
reached the streets that "fifty to sixty armed and determined black men had 
1 58. Id. at 104. 
1 59. Id. at 102. 
1 60. See supra Part l.c.2. 
1 6 1 .  JACK 0. FONER, BLACKS AND THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A NEW PERSPFC-
TIVE 20-2 1 ( 1974). 
1 62. See CoTTROL, supra note 97, at 63. 
1 63 .  0sCAR HANDLIN, BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS: A STUDY IN ACCULTURATION 175 & n. 1 IO 
( 1959). 
1 64. CUR RY, supra note 1 53,  at 100; VICTOR ULLMAN, MARTIN R. DELANY: THE BEGINNINGS 
OF BLACK NATIONALISM 29-3 1 ( 197 1). 
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barricaded themselves in a building beyond the police lines."165 
Undoubtedly, the most striking examples of the salutary use of firearms by 
blacks in defense of their liberty, and concurrently the disastrous results from 
the denial of the right to carry firearms in self-defense, lie in the same inci­
dent. In Cincinnati, in September 1841, racial hostility erupted in two nights 
of assaults by white mobs of up to 1500 people. On the first evening, after 
destroying property owned by blacks in the business district, mobs descended 
upon the black residential section, there to be repulsed by blacks who fired 
into the crowd, forcing it out of the area. The crowd returned, however, 
bringing with it a six-pound cannon, and the battle ensued. Two whites and 
two blacks were killed, and more than a dozen of both races were wounded. 
Eventually, the militia took control, but on the next day the blacks were 
disarmed at the insistence of whites, and all adult black males were taken 
into protective custody. On the second evening, white rioters again assaulted 
the black residential district, resulting in more personal injury and property 
damage. 166 
This history shows that if racism in the antebellum period was not limited 
to the southern states, neither was racial violence. Competition with and 
hostility toward blacks accounted for this violence in northern states, 
whereas the need to maintain slavery and maintain security for the white 
population accounted for racial violence in southern states. Another differ­
ence between the two regions is that in the southern states blacks did not 
have the means to protect themselves, while in northern states, blacks by and 
large had access to firearms and were willing to use them. 
The 1 841 Cincinnati riot represents the tragic, misguided irony of the 
city's authorities who, concerned with the safety of the black population, 
chose to disarm and imprison them-chose, in effect, to leave the black pop­
ulation of Cincinnati as southern authorities left the black population in slave 
states, naked to whatever indignities private parties might heap upon them, 
�d dependent on a government either unable or unwilling to protect their 
nghts. A� a symbol for the experience of northern blacks protecting them­
selves agamst deprivations of liberty, the 1841 riot holds a vital lesson for 
those who would shape the content and meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Ill. ARMS AND THE POSTBELLUM SOUTHERN ORDER 
The end of the Civil War did more than simply bring about the end of 
165. Cuuv, rupra note 153, at IOS-06. 
1 66. Id. at 107-08· WENDEL p D C ' L · ABNEY, INCINNATl'S COLORED CITIZENS' HISTORICAL SO-����AL' AN
R
D BIOGR�PHICAL 48-55 (Dabney Publishing Co. 1970) (1926); Cincinnati Riot, AT L EG. (Balt1more), Sept. 1 1 , 1 841 ,  at 32. 
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slavery; it brought about a sharpened conflict between two contrasting con­
stitutional visions. One vision, largely held by northern Republicans, saw the 
former slaves as citizens167 entitled to those rights long deemed as natural 
rights in Anglo-American society. Their's was a vision of national citizen­
ship and national rights, rights that the federal government had the responsi­
bility to secure for the freedmen and, indeed, for all citizens. This vision, 
developed during the antislavery struggle and heightened by the Civil War, 
caused Republicans of the Civil War and postwar generation to view the 
question of federalism and individual rights in a way that was significantly 
different from that of the original framers of the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. If many who debated the original Constitution feared that the newly 
created national government could violate long established rights, those who 
changed the Constitution in the aftermath of war and slavery had firsthand 
experience with states violating fundamental rights. The history of the right 
to bear arms is, thus, inextricably linked with the efforts to reconstruct the 
nation and bring about a new racial order. 
If the northern Republican vision was to bring the former slaves into the 
ranks of citizens, the concern of the defeated white South was to preserve as 
much of the antebellum social order as could survive northern victory and 
national law. The Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amend­
ment168 abolished slavery; chattel slavery as it existed before the war could 
not survive these developments. Still, in the immediate aftermath of the war, 
the South was not prepared to accord the general liberties to the newly eman­
cipated black population that northern states had allowed their free black 
populations. 169 Instead, while recognizing emancipation, southern states im-
167. Even during the Civil War, the Lincoln administration and Congress acted on the legal 
assumption that free blacks were citizens. Despite Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott that 
neither free blacks nor slaves could be citizens, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (15 How.) 393, 4 1 7  
( 1 856), Lincoln's Attorney General Edward Bates issued an opinion in 1 862 declaring that free 
blacks were citizens and entitled to be masters of an American vessel. See 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 382, 
4 1 3  ( 1 862). That same year, Congress amended the t 792 militia statute, striking out the restriction 
of militia membership to white men. See Act of July 17, 1 862, ch. 36' . 
� 12, 12 Sta!. 597, 599. 
While it could be argued that these measures were in part motivated by military needs, 1! sho_
uld be 
noted that the United States and various states had previously enlisted black troops dunng time of 
crisis despite the restrictions in the 1 792 Act. See supra Part I.c.2. Thus, these measures reflected 
long standing Republican and antislavery beliefs concerning the
_ �
itizen�hi� of f�ee Negroes. See 
generally Cottrol, supra note 9 t .  For a good discussion of black c1t1zensh1p nghts m the antebellum 
North, see generally Finkelman, supra note 99. 
1 68 .  Section 1 .  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
1 69. See generally Finkelman, supra note 99. 
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posed on the freedmen the legal disabilities of the antebellum free Negro 
population. As one North Carolina statute indicated: 
All persons of color who are now inhabitants of this state shall be entitled 
to the same privileges, and are subject to the same burdens and disabilities, 
as by the laws of the state were conferred on, or were attached to, free 
persons of color, prior to the ordinance of emancipation, except as the same 
may be changed by law. 170 
In 1 865 and 1866, southern states passed a series of statutes known as the 
black codes. These statutes, which one historian described as "a twilight 
zone between slavery and freedom,"171 were an expression of the South's de­
termination to maintain control over the former slaves. Designed in part to 
ensure that traditional southern labor arrangements would be preserved, 
these codes were attempts " 'to put the state much in the place of the former 
master. '  "172 The codes often required blacks to sign labor contracts that 
bound black agricultural workers to their employers for a year. 173 Blacks 
were forbidden from serving on juries, and could not testify or act as parties 
against whites. 174 Vagrancy laws were used to force blacks into labor con­
tracts and to limit freedom of movement. 1 1s 
As further indication that the former slaves had not yet joined the ranks of 
free citizens, southern states passed legislation prohibiting blacks from carry­
ing firearms without licenses, a requirement to which whites were not sub­
jected. The Louisiana176 and Mississippi1 77 statutes were typical of the 
1 70. North Carolina Black Code, ch. 40, 1 866 N.C. Sess. Laws 99, reprinted in 1 DOCUMEN­
TARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL, MILITARY, SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, EDUCA­
TIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL, 1 865 TO THE PRESENT TIME 291 (Walter L. Fleming, ed., 1 960) 
[hereinafter DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION]. 
1 7 1 .  KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1 865- 1877, at 80 (1965). 
1 72. FONER, supra note 29, at 198 (1988) (quoting letter from William H. Trescot to James L. 
Orr, Dec. 1 3 , 1865, South Carolina's Governor's Papers). Eugene Genovese has quoted an antebel­
lum observer who described the free Negro as "a sort of inmate on parole." GENOVESE, supra note 
97, at 399. 
1 73 .  FoNER, supra note 29, at 200. 
1 74. STAMPP, supra note 1 7 1 ,  at 80. 
1 7 5.  Id. 
1 76: No Negro who is n�t in the �ilita� service shall be allowed to carry fire-arms, or any kind of wea�ns, w1thm the pansh, without the special permission of his employers, ap­
proved and �n�orsed b� lhe �earest and most convenient chief of patrol. Any one violat­ing the prov1s1ons of this section shall forfeit his weapons and pay a fine of five dollars, or 
m default of the paym�nt of said fine, shall be forced to work five days on the public road, 
or suffer corporal punishment as hereinafter provided. 
Louisiana Statute of 1865 -pn·nted · Doc H • ·� Ill UMENTARY ISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION supra note 
1 70. at 280. 
' 
1 7 7  · [N]o freedman, free negro or mulatto, not in the military service of the United States 
gkovcmment, and not licensed so to do by the board of police of his or her county shall ccp or carry fire-arms of any kind or · · · 
' 
. . 
. 
• any ammunition dirk or bowie knife and on 
conv1ct1on thereof in the co nt rt h 11 be · 
' ' 
u Y cou s a punished by fine, not exceeding ten dollars, 
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restrictions found in the codes. Alabama's178 was even ·harsher. 
The restrictions in the black codes caused strong concerns among northern 
Republicans. The charge that the South was trying to reinstitute slavery was 
frequently made, both in and out of Congress. 119 The news that the freed­
men were being deprived of the right to bear arms was of particular concern 
to the champions of Negro citizenship. For them, the right of the black pop­
ulation to possess weapons was not merely of symbolic and theoretical im­
portance; it was vital both as a means of maintaining the recently reunited 
Union and a means of preventing virtual reenslavement of those formerly 
held in bondage. Faced with a hostile and recalcitrant white South deter­
mined to preserve the antebellum social order by legal and extra-legal 
means, 1 80 northern Republicans were particularly alarmed at provisions of 
the black codes that effectively preserved the right to keep and bear arms for 
former Confederates while disarming blacks, the one group in the South with 
clear unionist sympathies. 1 8 1 This fed the determination of northern Repub-
and pay the cost of such proceedings, and all such arms or ammunition shall be forfeited 
to the informer; and it shall be the duty of every civil and military officer to arrest any 
freedman, free negro, or mulatto found with any such arms or ammunition, and cause him 
or her to be committed to trial in default of bail. 
Mississippi Statute of 1 865, reprinted in DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra 
note 170, at 290. 
178. 
l. That it shall not be lawful for any freedman, mulatto, or free person of color in this 
State, to own fire-arms, or carry about his person a pistol or other deadly weapon. 
2. That after the 20th day of January, 1866, any person thus offending may be arrested 
upon the warrant of any acting justice of the peace, and upon conviction fined any sum 
not exceeding $100 or imprisoned in the county jail, or put to labor on the public works of 
any county, incorporated town, city, or village, for any term not exceeding three months. 
3. That if any gun, pistol or other deadly weapon be found in the possession of any 
freedman, mulatto or free person of color, the same may by any justice of the peace, 
sheriff, or constable be taken from such freedman, mulatto, or free person of color; and if 
such person is proved to be the owner thereof, the same shall, upon an order of any justice 
of the peace, be sold, and the proceeds thereof paid over to such freedman, mulatto, or 
person of color owning the same. 
4. That it shall not be lawful for any person to sell, give, or lend fire-arms or ammuni­
tion of any description whatever, to any freedman, free negro or mulatto; and any person 
so violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon convic­
tion thereof shall be fined in the sum of not less than fifty nor more than one hundred , 
dollars, at the discretion of the jury trying the case. 
See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 209 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967). 
1 79. See FONER, supra note 29, at 225-227; STAMPP, supra note 17 1 ,  at �0-8 1.  . 
1 80. The Ku Klux Klan was formed in 1 866 and immediately launched its campaign of terror 
against blacks and southern white unionists. See FONER, supra note 29, at 342; infra text at notes 
2 1 7-223. 
I 8 1 .  During the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1 866, Republican Representative �i�ney 
Clarke of Kansas expressed the fears of many northern Republicans who saw the clear mthtary 
implications of allowing the newly formed white militias in Southern states to d1sann blacks: 
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licans to provide national enforcement of the Bill of Rights. 182 
The efforts to disarm the freedmen were in the background when the 39th 
Congress debated the Fourteenth Amendment, and played an important part 
in convincing the 39th Congress that traditional notions concerning federal­
ism and individual rights needed to change. While a full exploration of the 
incorporation controversy 183 is beyond the scope of this article, it should be 
noted that Jonathan Bingham, author of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privi­
leges or Immunities Clause, 1s4 clearly stated that it applied the Bill of Rights 
to the states. m Others shared that same understanding. 186 
Although the history of the black codes persuaded the 39th Congress that 
Congress and the federal courts must be given the authority to protect citi­
zens against state deprivations of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court in its 
earliest decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment moved to maintain much of 
the structure of prewar federalism. A good deal of the Court's decision-mak-
Who, sir, were those men? Not the present militia; but the brave black soldiers of the 
Union, disarmed and robbed by this wicked and despotic order. Nearly every white man 
in [Mississippi) that could bear arms was in the rebel ranks. Nearly all of their able­
bodied colored men who could reach our lines enlisted under the old ftag. Many of these 
brave defenders of the nation paid for their arms with which they went to battle. And I 
regret, sir, that justice compels me to say, to the disgrace of the Federal Government, that 
the "reconstructed" state authorities of Mississippi were allowed to rob and disarm our 
veteran soldiers and arm the rebels fresh from the field of treasonable strife. Sir, the dis­
armed loyalists of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are powerless today, and op­
pressed by the pardoned and encouraged rebels of those States. 
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1 78, at 209. 
1 82.  Representative Roswell Hart, Republican from New York, captured those sentiments dur-
ing the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866: 
. 
The Constitution clearly describes that to be a republican form of government for which 
1t was expressly framed. A government which shall "establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquillity, �rovide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the �les.<ungs
. 
of liberty"; a government whose "citizens shall be entitled to all privileges and 
1mmumt1es of other citizens"; where "no law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion"; where "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"; 
wh�re "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated," and where "no person 
shall be deprived o� life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 
Have these rebellious States such a form of government? If they have not, it is the duty 
of the United States to guaranty that they have it speedily. 
Ttn: RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 1 78, at 1 93 . 
.
. 
1 8 ) :  For a good general discussion of the incorporation question, see MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No 
s r Al l·. SllAl.1. 
.
ARRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS ( 1986). For 
8 good discussion of the 39th Congress's views concerning the Second Amendment and its incorpo· 
ration v.1� the Fourteenth, see HALBROOK, supra note 6, at 107-23 . 
. 
. 1 84 No state �hall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of callzc:ns of the United States; . . . .  " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l .  
: :�· ;d""'i����NSTR�CTION AME�DMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 178, at 156-60, 2 17- 1 8 .  
. · 
f 
: a rcmar s by Republican Sen. Jacob Howard of Michigan on privileges and immu· ntllell o citizens). 
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ing that weakened the effectiveness of the Second Amendment was part of 
the Court's overall process of eviscerating the Fourteenth Amendment soon 
after its enactment. 
That process began with the Slaughterhouse Cases, 187 which dealt a severe 
blow to the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, a 
blow from which it has yet to recover. It was also within its early examina­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Court first heard a claim directly 
based on the Second Amendment. Ironically, the party first bringing an alle­
gation before the Court concerning a Second Amendment violation was the 
federal government. In United States v. Cruikshank, 188 federal officials 
brought charges against William Cruikshank and others under the Enforce­
ment Act of 1870. 189 Cruikshank had been charged with violating the rights 
of two black men to peaceably assemble and to bear arms. The Supreme 
Court held that the federal government had no power to protect citizens 
against private action that deprived them of their constitutional rights. The 
Court held that the First and Second Amendments were limitations on Con­
gress, not on private individuals and that, for protection against private crim­
inal action, the individual was required to look to state governments. 190 
The Cruikshank decision, which dealt a serious blow to Congress' ability 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, was part of a larger campaign of the 
Court to ignore the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to 
bring about a revolution in federalism, as well as race relations.191 While the 
Court in the late 1 870s and 1880s was reasonably willing to strike down 
instances of state sponsored racial discrimination, 192 it also showed a strong 
concern for maintaining state prerogative and a disinclination to carry out 
1 87. Butchers Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 83 
U.S. ( 16  Wall.) 36 ( 1 872). 
1 88. 92 U.S. 542 ( 1 876). 
1 89. 16 Stat. 140 ( 1870) (codified as amended at 1 8  U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1988)). The relevant 
passage reads: 
That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise u�n the 
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any prov1s10n of 
this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent .or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States or because of his having exercised the 
same, such persons shall be held guilty of a felony . . . .  
Id. at 14 1  
1 90. 92  U.S. at 548-59. 
19 1 .  This can also be seen in the Court's reaction to the federal government's first public accom­
modations statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1875. With much the same re�ning •
. 
th.e Cour
t held 
that Congress had no power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations w1thm states. See 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 ( 1 883). 
. . . 
1 92 . See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1 1 8 U.S. 356, 373 ( 1 886) (declaring the admm1strat1on. of a 
m unicipal ordinance discriminatory); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 ( 1 879) (stnkmg 
down a statute prohibiting blacks from serving as jurors). 
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the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to make states re­
spect national rights. 
This trend was demonstrated in Presser v. Illinois, 193 the second case in 
which the Court examined the Second Amendment. Presser involved an Illi­
nois statute which prohibited individuals who were not members of the mili­
tia from parading with arms. 194 Although Justice William Woods, author of 
the majority opinion, noted that the Illinois statute did not infringe upon the 
right to keep and bear arms, 19s he nonetheless went on to declare that the 
Second Amendment was a limitation on the federal and not the state govern­
ments. Curiously enough, Woods's opinion also contended that, despite the 
nonapplicability of the Second Amendment to state action, states were for­
bidden from disarming their populations because such action would interfere 
with the federal government's ability to maintain the sedentary militia. 196 
With its view that the statute restricting armed parading did not interfere 
with the right to keep and bear arms, and its view that Congress's militia 
power prevented the states from disarming its citizens, the Presser Court had 
gone out of its way in dicta to reaffirm the old federalism and to reject the 
framers' view of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Bill of Rights applied 
to the states. 
The rest of the story is all too well known. The Court's denial of an ex­
panded roll for the federal government in enforcing civil rights played a cru­
cial role in redeeming white rule. The doctrine in Cruikshank, that blacks 
would have to look to state government for protection against criminal con­
spiracies, gave the green light to private forces, often with the assistance of 
state and local governments, that sought to subjugate the former slaves and 
their descendants. Private violence was instrumental in driving blacks from 
the ranks of voters. 197 It helped force many blacks into peonage, a virtual 
return to slavery, 198 and was used to force many blacks into a state of ritual­
ized subservience. 199 With the protective arm of the federal government 
withdrawn, protection of black lives and property was left to largely hostile 
state governments. In the Jim Crow era that would follow, the right to 
poss� arms �ould take on critical importance for many blacks. This right, 
seen m the eighteenth century as a mechanism that enabled a majority to 
1 9 3 .  1 1 6 U.S. 252 (1 886). 
I 94. Id. at 253.  
1 95 .  Id. at 265. 
1 96. Id. 
1 97 .  RA Rl . f., supra note 29, at 88-90; STAMPP, supra note 1 7 1 ,  at 1 99-204. I 9R. Benno C. Schmidt Jr Pr 
· I d p · d" . E p, 
• · • mcip e an re1u ice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progres-
u �  �rri. art 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. l. REV. 646 653-55 ( 1982) 1 99 .  Gf.ORGE M FREDRICKSON W S 
' . 
So . 
. 
. 
• HITE UPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN ANI> UTH At'RICAN HISTORY 25 1 -52 ( 1 98 1 )· C CRIMINAi .  JUSTICE 32 ( 1 978)- J 
• HARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, 
TlONS IN THE. AM�RIC N S 
• OE
S
L WILLIAMSON, A RAGE FOR ORDE R: BLACK/WH ITE RELA· A OUTH INCE EMANCIPATION 124 ( 1 9 86). 
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check the excesses of a potentially tyrannical national government, would for 
many blacks in the twentieth century become a means of survival in the face 
of private violence and state indifference. 
IV. ARMS AND AFRO-AMERICAN SELF-DEFENSE IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: A HISTORY IGNORED 
For much of the twentieth century, the black experience in this country 
has been one of repression. This repression has not been limited to the south­
ern part of the country, nor is it a development divorced from the past. Born 
perhaps of cultural predisposition against blacks, 200 and nurtured by eco­
nomic competition between blacks and whites, particularly immigrant 
groups and those whites at the lower rungs of the economic scale,201 racism 
in the North continued after the Civil War, abated but not eliminated in its 
effects. 202 In the South, defeat in the Civil War and the loss of slaves as 
property confirmed white Southerners in their determination to degrade and 
dominate their black brethren. 203 
Immediately after the Civil War and the emancipation it brought, white 
Southerners adopted measures to keep the black population in its place. 204 
Southerners saw how Northerners had utilized segregation as a means to 
avoid the black presence in their lives,20s and they already had experience 
with segregation in southern cities before the war.206 Southerners extended 
this experience of segregation to the whole of southern life through the mech­
anism of "Jim Crow."2o7 Jim Crow was established both by the operation of 
200. See generally JORDAN, supra note 56, at 3-43. 
201 .  LITWACK, supra note 1 16, at 1 53-86. 
202. Cottrol, supra note 9 1 ,  at 1007-19. 
203. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22·23 (3d ed. 1974). 
204. See infra text accompanying notes 169-178. See generally WOODWARD, supra note 203, at 
2 2-29. 
205. See id. at 18-2 1 (the Jim Crow system was born in the North where systematic segregation, 
with the backing of legal and extralegal codes, penneated black life in the free stales by 1 860); see 
also LITWACK, supra note 1 1 6, at 97-99 (in addition to statutes and customs that limited the polit­
ical and judicial rights of blacks, extralegal codes enforced by public opinion perpetuated the 
North's systematic segregation of blacks from whites). 
206. See RICHARD c. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE CITIES: THE SoUTH 1 820-1 860, at 1 80-208 
( 1 964) (although more contact between blacks and whites occurred in urban areas of the South, 
both social standards and a legal blueprint continued the subjugation of blacks to whites). 
207. See generally WOODWARD, supra note 204. Jim Crow has been said to have established 
an etiquette of discrimination. It was not enough for blacks to be second class citizens. 
denied the franchise and consigned to inferior schools. Black subordination was rein­
forced by a racist punctilio dictating separate seating on public accommodat�ons, separate 
water fountains and restrooms, separate seats in courthouses, and separate Bibles to swear 
in black witnesses about to give testimony before the Jaw. The list of separations was 
ingenious and endless. Blacks became like a group of American untouchables, ritually 
separated from the rest of the population. 
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law, including the black codes and other legislation, and by an elaborate eti­
quette of racially restrictive social practices. The Civil Rights Cases 208 and 
Plessy v. Ferguson 209 gave the South freedom to pursue the task of separating 
black from white. The Civil Rights Cases went beyond Cruikshank, even 
more severely restricting congressional power to provide for the equality of 
blacks under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,210 and Plessy v. Fergu­
son declared separate facilities for blacks and whites to be consonant with the 
Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of "equal protection of the laws., ,21 1 In 
effect, states and individuals were given full freedom to effect their "social 
prejudices"212 and "racial instincts"213 to the detriment of blacks throughout 
the South and elsewhere.214 
These laws and customs were given support and gruesome effect by vio­
lence. In northern cities, violence continued to threaten blacks after Recon­
struction and after the tum of the century. For instance, in New York, 
hostility between blacks and immigrant whites ran high.21s Negro strike­
breakers were often used to  break strikes of union workers.216 Regular 
clashes occurred between blacks and the Irish throughout the nineteenth cen­
tury, 217 until finally a major race riot broke in 1900 that lasted four days.2 18 
Diamond & Cottrol, supra note 103, at 264-65 (footnote omitted). 
208. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
209. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
2 10. 109 U.S. 3. 
2 1 1 .  163 U.S. at 548. 
2 12. Id. at 551. 
2 1 3. Id. 
2 14. Jim Crow was not exclusively a southern experience after the Civil War. For example, at 
one point or another, antimiscegenation laws have been enacted by forty-one of the fifty states. 
Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 5 3  GEO. LJ. 
49,
_ 
50-� 1 & 5
.
o
. 
�-9 (1964). The Adams case, in which the federal government challenged separate 
unaverstty fac1ht1cs throughout the union, involved the State of Pennsylvania. See Adams v. Rich­
ardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 100 (D.D.C. 1973); Adams v. Richardson, 3 5 1  F. Supp. 636, 637 (D.D.C. 
19!2>: Hansberry v. Lee, 3 1 1  U.S. 32 (1940), involved a covenant restricting the sale of property in 
llh nois to blacks. The set of consolidated cases that outlawed the separate but equal doctrine would 
later be kno�n as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954), the defendant board of education 
was located tn Kansas, a Northern state. 
2 ! 5. GILBERT 0soFSKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A GHETTO: NEGRO NEW YORK 1890-
1 9 30, at 46-52 ( 1 963). 
2 16. Id. at 42. 
2 1 7 . Id. at 45-46. 
2 18 .  Id. at 46-52. 
After the riot ended, the situation nevertheless remained tense. Negroes began to arm. 
Revolvers and other wcapo ·1 ns were east Y purchased at local pawnshops and hard ware 
:::es. In a survey made of [the area where the riot took place], just one day after the riot, 
.. !l
as
h 
fi
d
ound that 145 revolvers and a substantial amount of ammunition had been sold­a a gone to negrocs " LI d w·11· . h 
· oy 1 tams, a Negro bartender was seen leaving one store wit an arsenal of weapons When asked h h . 
' . 
"I underst d th , k · . 
w at e was gomg to do with them, he replied, 
h.  an
.. 
ey re nockmg down negroes 'round here. The first man tries it on me gets t ts . . . . Other Negroes w med th h' a at no w tte men were going to bother them. As 
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And i n  19 19, after a Chicago race riot, 38  deaths and 537 injuries were re­
ported as a result of attacks on the black population.219 
In the South, racism found expression, not only through the power of un­
organized mobs, but also under the auspices of organized groups like the Ku 
Klux Klan. The Klan started in 1866 as a social organization of white Civil 
War veterans in Pulaski, Tennessee,220 complete with pageantry, ritual, and 
opportunity for plain and innocent amusement.22 1 But the group soon ex­
panded and turned its attention to more sinister activities. The Klan's  activi­
ties, primarily in the South, expanded to playing tricks on blacks and then to 
terroristic nightriding against them.222 The Ku Klux Klan in this first incar­
nation was disbanded, possibly as early as January 1 868, and no later than 
May 1 870.223 By that time, the Klan's activities had come to include as­
saults, murder, lynchings, and political repression against blacks, 22• and 
Klan-like activities would continue and contribute to the outcome of the fed­
eral election of 1 876 that ended Reconstruction.22� As one author has put it, 
"The Invisible Empire faded away, not because it had been defeated, but 
because it had won. "226 
The Ku Klux Klan would be revived in 1 9 1 5  after the release of D.W. 
Griffith's film Birth of a Nation, 227 but, both pre- and post-dating the Klan's 
revival, Klan tactics would play a familiar role in the lives of black people in 
the South; for up to the time of the modern civil rights movement, lynching 
would be virtually an everyday occurrence. Between 1 882 and 1968, 4,743 
policemen patrolled the Negro blocks they were showered with bricks, bottles, and gar­
bage, thrown from rooftops and tenement windows. They fired back wilh revolvers. I t  
seems miraculous that n o  one was killed. 
Id. at 49-50. 
2 19. CHICAGO COMMISSION OF RACE RELATIONS, THE NEORO IN CHICAGO: A STUl>Y 01' 
RAC" RELATIONS AND A RACE RIOT ( 1 922) 595-98, 602. 640- 49, rrpriflttd in THF. NF.ORO ANI> 
THF.. CITY 126-33 (Richard B. Sherman ed .. 1970). After World War I, an outbreak of racial vio­
lence against blacks was recorded from 1 9 1 7  to 192 1 .  Riots occurred in Chicago, Omaha. Washing­
ton , D.C .. and East St. Louis, Illinois. Id. at 126. 
220. WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE Ku KLUX Kt.AN IN AMF.RICA 33 ( I  987). 
22 1 .  Id. at 33-35. 
222. Id. at 37. 
223 . STANLEY f. HORN, INVISIBLE EMPIRE: THE STORY OF THE Ku Kt.UX Kl.AN 1 866- 1 8 7 1 .  
at 3 5 6-59 ( 1 969). 
224. See geflera/ly WILLIAM L. KATZ, THE INVISIBLE EMPSRE: THE Ku K1.ux Kt.AN IMPAn 
ON HISTORY 19-59 ( 1 986). 
225. See WADE, supra note 220, at 57, 1 10. 1 1 .  Through the intimidalion of black vo1cn. the 
Democratic party in the South, wilh which mosl Klansmen were affilialcd, recovered. and Repuhli· 
can strength waned. The Democrats captured the House of Representatives in 1 874, and with the 
con t roversial compromise between Dcmocrals and Republicans thal elevated Rutherford B. Hay� 
to the Presidency in 1 877, the end of Reconstruction was marked. Id. 
226. KATZ, supra note 224, at 58. 
227. WADE, supra note 220, at 1 20. 
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persons were lynched, the overwhelming number of these in the South;228 
3,446 of these persons were black, 229 killed for the most part for being ac­
cused in one respect or another of not knowing their place. 230 These accusa­
tions were as widely disparate as arson,23 1  theft,232 sexual contact or even 
being too familiar with a white woman,233 murdering or assaulting a white 
person, 234 hindering a lynch mob, 235 protecting one's legal rights, 236 not 
228. STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL 5 
(1 988). 
229. Id. 
230. NATIONAL Ass'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, THIRTY YEARS OF 
LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1889-1918 (1919) reported as follows: 
Among colored victims [of lynching], 35.8 per cent were accused of murder; 28.4 per 
cent of rape and "attacks upon women" (19 per cent of rape and 9.4 per cent of "attacks 
upon women"); 17.8 per cent of crimes against the person (other than those already men­
tioned) and against property; 12 per cent were charged with miscellaneous crimes and in 
5.6 per cent no crime was charged. The 5.6 per cent. [sic] classified under "Absence of 
Crime" does not include a number of cases in which crime was alleged but in which it was 
afterwards shown conclusively that no crime had been committed. 
Id. at 10. 
231 .  See, e.g., Negro and Wife Hanged, Suspected of Barn-Burning, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, 
Nov. 26, 1914, reprinted in RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS 92 ( 1988). 
232. See, e.g., Negro Hanged as Mule Thief. ATLANTA CONST., July 15,  1914, reprinted in GINZ· 
BURG, supra note 231, at 92; Would be Chicken Thief. N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 6, 19 14, reprinted in 
GINZBURG, supra note 231 , at 93 (reporting a black man having been lynched "[fjor the crime of 
crawling under the house of a white citizen, with the intention of stealing chickens"). 
233. See, e.g., WHITFIELD, supra note 228 (Emmett Till was killed in 1955 because he was 
thought to have whistled at a white woman). Other major works describing individual lynchings 
are JAMES R. McGOVERN, ANATOMY OF A LYNCHING: THE KILLING OF CLAUDE NEAL (1982) 
(describing a lynching in 1934 occasioned by the rape of a white woman); HOWARD SMEAD, 
BLOOD JUSTICE: THE LYNCHING OF MACK CHARLES PARKER (1 986) (describing another lynch­
ing of a black man for the rape of a white woman). See also Blacks Lynched for Remark Which 
May Have Been 'Hello, ' PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 3, 1916, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 
98; Inter-Racial Love Affair Ended by Lynching of Man, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Jan. 14, 1922, 
reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 158; Negro Ambushed, Lynched/or Writing White Girl, 
MEMPHIS CoM. APPEAL, Nov. 26, 1921, reprinted in Ginzburg, supra note 231 ,  at 156; Negro 
Insults White Women; Is Shot and Strung Up, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Oct. 10, 19 16, re­
printed in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 1 1 1 ; Negro Shot· Dead for Kissing His White Girlfriend, 
CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 3 1 ,  1915, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 95; Negro Youth Muti­
lated for Kissing White Girl, BoSTON GUARDIAN, Apr. 30, 1914, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra 
note 231, at 90; White Girl Is Jailed, Negro Friend Is Lynched, GALVESTON TRIB. (Texas), June 21, 
1934, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 2 1 7. 
234. See, e.g. , Hoosiers Hang Negro Killer, CHI. REC., Feb. 27, 1901, reprinted in G1NZBURG, 
supra note 23 1 ,  at 37; Negro and White Scuffle, Negro Is Jailed, Lynched, ATLANTA CONST., July 6, 
1933, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 231, at 197; Negro Shot After Striking Merchant Who 
Dirtied Him, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Aug. 28, 1913, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 231, 
at 88; Negro Suspected of Slaying Bartender Is Hung by Mob, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 3 1 ,  1899, 
reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 23. 
235. See, e.g., Negro Father is Lynched; Aided Son to Escape Mob, BALT. AFRO-AM., July 6, 
1923, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1,  at 170. 
236. See, e.g., Miss. Minister Lynched, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 26, 1944, reprinted in 
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showing proper respect, 237 or simply being in the wrong place at the wrong 
time.238 
This is not to say that blacks went quietly or tearfully to their deaths. 
Oftentimes they were able to use firearms to defend themselves, though usu­
ally not with success: Jim Mcllherron was lynched in Estell Springs, Tennes­
see, after having exchanged over one thousand rounds with his pursuers. 239 
The attitude of individuals such as Mcllherron is summed up by Ida B. 
Wells-Barnett, a black antilynching activist who wrote of her decision to 
carry a pistol : 
I had been warned repeatedly by my own people that something would 
happen if I did not cease harping on the lynching of three months before 
. . . . I had bought a pistol the first thing after [the lynching], because I 
expected some cowardly retaliation from the lynchers. I felt that one had 
better die fighting against injustice than to die like a dog or a rat in a trap. 
I had already determined to sell my life as dearly as possible if attacked. I 
felt if I could take one lyncher with me, this would even up the score a little 
bit.240 
When blacks used firearms to protect their rights, they were often partially 
successful but were ultimately doomed. In 1 920, two black men in Texas 
GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 236 (reporting the lynching of a black man for having hired a lawyer 
in a property dispute). 
237. See, e.g .. Impertinent Question. BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 23, 1913, reprinted in GINZ­
RURG, supra note 231 ,  at 88 (relating that a black man was lynched after he asked whether a white 
woman's husband was home); Insulting Remark, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Oct. 23, 1 9 1 3, re­
printed in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1,  at 89 (relating that a black man was lynched for having made 
an insulting remark to a white woman); Negro Half- Wit is Lynched; Threatened to Lynch Whites. 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Aug. 25, 1913 , reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 87; Negro 
Insults White Women; Is Shot and Strung Up. MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Oct. 10, 1 9 1 6, re­
printed in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 1 1 1; Train Porter Lynched After Insult to Woman. AT­
LANTA CONST., May 9, 1 920, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1,  at 130. 
238. See, e.g., An Innocent Man Lynched, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 1 , 1900, reprinted in GINZBURG, 
supra note 231 ,  at 3 1 ;  Boy Lynched at McGhee for No Special Cause. ST. LoUis ARGUS, May 27, 
1 92 1 ,  reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 231 ,  at I 50; Negro Suspect Eludes Mob; Sister Lynched 
Instead, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 1 7, 1901 ,  reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 38; Posse Lynches 
Innocent Man When Thwarted in Its Hunt, WILMINGTON ADVOC., Dec. 16, 1922, reprinted in 
GINZBURG, supra note 231 ,  at 1 66; Texans lynch Wrong Negro. CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1 895. re­
printed in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 9; Thwarted Mob Lynches Brother of Intended Victim. 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Aug. 5, 1 9 1 1 , reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 231 .  at 73. 
239. Blood-Curdling Lynching Witnessed by 2, 000 Persons. CHATIANOOGA TIMES, Feb. 13,  
1 9 1 8, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, 1 14- 1 1 6. 
240. IDA B. WELLS-BARNETI, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA 8. 
WELLS 62 (Alfreda M. Duster ed., 1 970). Wells-Barnett's fears for her safety, fortunately, were 
never realized. Born a slave in 1 862, she died of natural causes in 1931 .  Id. at xxx-xui. 7. Eli 
Cooper of Caldwell, Georgia was not so lucky, however. Cooper was alleged to have said that the 
''Negro has been run over for fifty years, but it must stop now. and pistols and shotguns are the only 
weapons to stop a mob." Cooper was dragged from his home by a mob of 20 men and killed as his 
wife looked on. Church Burnings Follow Negro Agitator's Lynching, Cm. DEFENDER, Sept. 6, 1 9 1 9. 
reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 124. 
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fired on and killed two whites in self-defense. The black men were arrested 
and soon lynched.241 When the sheriff of Aiken, South Carolina, came with 
three deputies to a black household to attempt a warrantless search and 
struck one female family member, three other family members used a hatchet 
and firearms in self-defense, killing the sheriff. The three wounded survivors 
were taken into custody, and after one was acquitted of murdering the sher­
iff, with indications of a similar verdict for the other two, all three were 
lynched. 242 
Although individual efforts of blacks to halt violence to their persons or 
property were largely unsuccessful, there were times that blacks succeeded 
through concerted or group activity in halting l ynchings. In her autobiogra­
phy, Ida Wells-Barnett reported an incident in Memphis in 1 89 1  in which a 
black militia unit for two or three nights guarded approximately 1 00  jailed 
blacks who were deemed at risk of mob violence. When it seemed the crisis 
had passed, the militia unit ceased its work. It was only after the militia unit 
left that a white mob stormed the jail and lynched three black inmates. 243 
A. Philip Randolph, the longtime head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, and Walter White, onetime executive secretary of the National As­
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People, vividly recalled incidents 
in which their fathers had participated in collective efforts to use firearms to 
successfully forestall lynchings and other mob violence. As a thirteen-year­
old, White participated in his father's experiences,244 which, he reported, left 
him "gripped by the knowledge of my own identity, and in the depths of my 
soul, I was vaguely aware that I was glad of it. "245 After his father stood 
a�ed at a jail all night to ward off lynchers, 246 Randolph was left with a 
v1s1on, not "of powerlessness, but of the 'possibilities of salvation,' which re­
sided in unity and organization. "247 
The �illingness of blacks to use firearms to protect their rights, their lives, 
and th�1r property, alongside their ability to do so successfully when acting 
c�llect1vely, renders many gun control statutes, particularly of Southern ori­
gm, all the more worthy of condemnation. This is especially so in view of the 
2� 1 .  l�tter from Texas Reveals Lynching's Ironic Facts, N.Y. NEGRO WORLD, Aug. 22, 1920, 
reprmted in GtNZBURG, supra note 2 3 1 ,  at 139·40. 
242· Lo�e Su�fror of Atrocity Recounts Events of Lynching, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, June I ,  1 927, repnnted Ill G!NZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 1 75-78. 
243. WELLS·BARNEIT supra t 240 50 . 
. f 
h 
• no e 
• at . To forestall the occurrence of future mc1dents o t e same nature a Tennessee rt d ed h · k . 1 .  . . ' cou or er t e local shenff to take charge of the arms of the blac mt Ilia unit. Id. 
244. W Al TER WHITE A M C 
. 
CITY 
' AN ALLED WHITE 4- 1 2  ( 1 948) reprinted in THE NEGRO AND THE 
• supra note 219, at 1 2 1 -26. 
' 
24S. Id. at 126. 
246. JERVIS ANDERSON A p 
247 ld 4 
' . HILLIP RANDOLPH : A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT 4 1 - 42 ( 1 973). 
. . at 2. 
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purpose of these statutes, which, like that of the gun control statutes of the 
black codes, was to disarm blacks. 
, 
This purpose has been recognized by some state judges. The Florida 
Supreme Court in 1 94 1  refused to extend a statute forbidding the carrying of 
a pistol on one's person to a situation in which the pistol was found in an 
automobile glove compartment. 248 In a concurrence, one judge spoke of the 
purpose of the statute: 
I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of 
1 893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this 
State drawn here for the purpose of working in the turpentine and lumber 
camps. The same condition existed when the Act was amended in 1 901 
and the Act was passed for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers and 
to thereby reduce the unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine 
and saw-mill camps and to give the white citizens in sparsely settled ares a 
better feeling of security. The statute was never intended to be applied to 
the white population and in practice has never been so applied.249 
The Ohio Supreme Court in 1920 construed the state's constitutional right 
of the people "to bear arms for their defense and security" not to forbid a 
statute outlawing the carrying of a concealed weapon. 250 In so doing, the 
court followed the lead of sister courts in Alabama,25 1 Arkansas,252 Geor­
gia,253 and Kentucky,254 over the objections of a dissenting judge who recog­
nized that "the race issue [in Southern states] has intensified a decisive 
purpose to entirely disarm the negro, and this policy is evident upon reading 
the opinions."255 
That the Southern states did not prohibit firearms ownership outright is 
fortuitous. During the 1 960s, while many blacks and white civil rights work­
ers were threatened and even murdered by whites with guns, firearms in the 
hands of blacks served a useful purpose, to protect civil rights workers and 
blacks from white mob and terrorist activity.256 
While the rate of lynchings in the South had slowed somewhat,257 it was 
still clear by 1960 that Southerners were capable of murderous violence in 
248. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1941). 
249. Id. at 703 (Buford, J . ,  concurring). 
250. State v. Nieto, 1 30 N.E. 663 (Ohio 1920). 
25 1 .  Dunston v. State, 27 So. 333 (Ala. 1900). 
252. Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99 (1 872). 
253. Brown v. State, 39 S.E. 873 (Ga. 1901). 
254. Commonwealth v .  Walker, 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 219 (1 885) (abstract). 
255. Nieto, 130 N.E. at 669 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting). 
256. See, e.g., John R. Salter, Jr. & Donald B. Kates, Jr., The Necessity of Acce5! to Firearms by 
Dissenters and Minorities Whom Government is Unwilling or Unable to Protect, m RESTRICTING 
HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT, 185, 1 89-93 (Donald B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1 979). 
257. According to records kept by the Tuskeegee Institute, 4,733 lynchings occurred between 
1 882 and 1 959. 4, 733 Mob Action Victims Since '82, Tuskeegee Reports, MONTGOMERY ADVER-
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pursuit of the Southern way of life. The 1 955 murder of Emmett Till, a 
fourteen-year-old boy killed in Money, Mississippi for wolf-whistling at a 
white woman, sent shock waves throughout the nation. 258 Two years later, 
the nation again would be shocked, this time by a riotous crowd outside 
Little Rock's Central High School bent on preventing nine black children 
from integrating the school under federal court order; President Eisenhower 
ordered federal troops to effectuate the court order.259 News of yet another 
prominent lynching in Mississippi reached the public in 1959.260 
In the early 1960s, Freedom Riders and protesters at sit-ins were attacked, 
and some suffered permanent damage at the hands of white supremacists. 261 
In 1 963, Medgar Evers, Mississippi secretary of the NAACP was killed.262 
Three college students were killed in Mississippi during the 1964 "Freedom 
Summer"; this killing would render their names-Andrew Goodman, James 
Chaney, and Michael Schwerner-and their sacrifice part of the public do­
main. 263 A church bombing in Birmingham that killed four small black chil­
dren, 264 the killing of a young white housewife helping with the march from 
Montgomery to Selma,265 and the destructive riot in Oxford, Mississippi,266 
that left two dead when James Meredith entered the University of Missis­
sippi helped make clear to the nation what blacks in the South had long 
known: white Southerners were willing to use weapons of violence, modern 
equivalents of rope and faggot, to keep blacks in their place. 
It struck many, then, as the height of blindness, confidence, courage, or 
moral certainty for the civil rights movement t o  adopt nonviolence as its 
credo, and to thus leave its adherents open to attack by terrorist elements 
within the white South. Yet, while nonviolence had its adherents among the 
mainstream civil rights organizations, many ordinary black people in the 
South believed in resistance and believed in the necessity of maintaining fire­
arms for personal protection, and these people lent their assistance and their 
TISER, April 26, 1959, reprinted in GlNZBURG, supra note 23 1 ,  at 244. Tuskeegee Institute's 
records show only ten more lynchings to have occurred by 1968. WHITFIELD, supra note 228, at 5. 
258. See WHITFIELD, supra note 228, at 23-108; see also Eyes on the Prize: America 's Civil Rights 
Years. 1 954-1965: A wakenings (1954-56) (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 21,  1986). 
259. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1 958); see also TONY A. FREYER, THE LITrLE ROCK CR_1s
_
1s: A CoNSTITU�tONAL IN�ERPRETATION ( 1984); Raymond T. Diamond, Confron tation as 
Re1oinder to Compromise: Reflections on the little Rock Desegregation Crisis, 1 1  NAT'L BLACK L.J. 
1 5 1 .  1 52- 1 64  ( 1989);
. 
�yes on the Prize: America 's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965: Fighting Back (/ 95 7-62) (PBS tclcv1s1on Broadcast, Jan. 28, 1986). 
260. See generally SMEAD, supra note 233. 
26 1 .  RHONDA BLUMBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 1960s FREEDOM STRUGGLE 65-8 1 ( 1 984). 262. C I V I i . RIGHTS: 1 960-66 1 90-9 1 (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1 967). 
263. Id. at 244-46. 
264. Id. at 1 8  7-88. 
265.  Id. at 303-0S. 
266. Id. at 1 1 0- 18 .  
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protection to the civil rights movement. 261 
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Daisy Bates, the leader of the Little Rock NAACP during the desegrega­
tion crisis, wrote in her memoirs that armed volunteers stood guard over her 
home. 268 Moreover, there are oral histories of such assistance. David Den­
nis, the black Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) worker who had been 
targeted for the fate that actually befell Goodman, Schwemer, and Chaney 
during the Freedom Summer,269 has told of black Mississippi citizens with 
firearms who followed civil rights workers in order to keep them safe.210 
Ad hoc efforts were not the sole means by which black Southern adherents 
of firearms protected workers in the civil rights movement. The Deacons for 
Defense and Justice were organized first in 1964 in Jonesboro, Louisiana, but 
received prominence in Bogalousa, Louisiana.271 The Deacons organized in 
Jonesboro after their founder saw the Ku Klux Klan marching in the street 
and realized that the "fight against racial injustice include[d] not one but two 
foes: White reactionaries and police."272 Jonesboro's Deacons obtained a 
charter and weapons, and vowed to shoot back if fired upon. 273 The word 
spread throughout the South, but most significantly to Bogalousa, where the 
267. Donald B. Kates, Jr., recalls that: 
As a civil rights worker in a Southern State during the early l 960's, I found that the 
possession of firearms for self-defense was almost universally endorsed by the black com­
munity, for it could not depend on police protection from the KKK. The leading civil 
rights lawyer in the state (then and now a nationally prominent figure) went nowhere 
without a revolver on his person or in his briefcase. The black lawyer for whom I worked 
principally did not carry a gun all the time, but he attributed the relative quiescence of the 
Klan to the fact that the black community was so heavily armed. Everyone remembered 
an incident several years before, in which the state's Klansmen attempted to break up a 
civil rights meeting and were routed by return gunfire. When one of our clients (a school­
teacher who had been fired for her leadership in the Movement) was threatened by the 
Klan, I joined the group that stood armed vigil outside her house nightly. No attack ever 
came-though the Klan certainly knew that the police would have done nothing to hinder 
or punish them. 
RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT, supra note 256, at 186. 
268. DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK, A MEMOIR 94 (1982). 
269. HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
REMEMBERED 275-76 ( 1977). 
270. Telephone interview with David Dennis (Oct. 30, 1991) .  
271 .  Hamilton Bims, Deacons/or Defense, EBONY, Sept. 1 965, at 25, 26; see also Roy Reed, The 
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273. Id. at 26. Like the Deacons for Defense and Justice was the Monroe, North Carolina chap­
ter of the NAACP, which acquired firearms and used them to deal with the Ku Klux Klan. ROB· 
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Klan was rumored to have its largest per capita membership.274 There, a 
local chapter of the Deacons would grow to include "about a tenth of the 
Negro adult male population,'' or about 900 members, although the organi­
zation was deliberately secretive about exact numbers. 275 What is known, 
however, is that in 1965 there were fifty to sixty chapters across Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama. 276 In Bogalousa, as elsewhere, the Deacons' job 
was to protect black people from violence, and they did so by extending vio­
lence to anyone who attacked.277 This capability and willingness to use 
force to protect blacks provided a deterrent to white terroristic activity. 
A prime example of how the Deacons accomplished their task lies in the 
experience of James Farmer, then head of (CORE), a frontline, mainstream 
civil rights group. Before Farmer left on a trip for Bogalousa, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation informed him that he had received a death threat 
from the Klan. The FBI apparently also informed the state police, who met 
Farmer at the airport. But at the airport also were representatives of the 
Bogalousa chapter of the Deacons, who escorted Farmer to the town. 
Farmer stayed with the local head of the Deacons, and the Deacons provided 
close security throughout the rest of this stay and Farmer's next. Farmer 
later wrote in his autobiography that he was secure with the Deacons, "in the 
knowledge that unless a bomb were tossed . . .  the Klan could only reach me 
if they were prepared to swap their lives for mine. "278 
Blacks in the South found the Deacons helpful because they were unable 
to rely upon police or other legal entities for racial justice. This provided a 
practical reason for a right to bear arms: In a world in which the legal sys­
tem was not to be trusted, perhaps the ability of the system's victims to resist 
might convince the system to restrain itself. 
States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm 
themselves for self-defense. 
Black Panther Part}'-Platform and Program, reprinted in REGINALD MAJOR A PANTHER Is A 
�LACK CAT �86 (1971). Yet, the Black Panthers deteriorated into an ineffecti�e group of revolu-
t1onancs, at limes using arguably c · · ) f er · · nmma means o euectuatmg their agenda. See generally GENE 
MAR.INF., THE BLACK PANTHERS ( 1969); Boeey SEALE, SEIZE THE TIME: THE STORY OF THE 
Bl.ACK PANTHER PARTY AND HUEY P. NEWTON ( 1 968). 
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There are interesting parallels between the history of African-Americans 
and discussion of the Second Amendment. For most of this century, the 
historiography of the black experience was at the periphery of the historical 
profession's consciousness, an area of scholarly endeavor populated by those 
who were either ignored or regarded with suspicion by the mainstream of the 
academy.279 Not until after World War II did the insights that could be 
learned from the history of American race relations begin to have a major 
influence on the works of constitutional policy makers in courts, legislatures, 
and administrative bodies. Moreover, it should be stressed that, for a good 
portion of the twentieth century, the courts found ways to ignore the consti­
tutional demands imposed by the reconstruction amendments. 280 
While discussion of the Second Amendment has been relegated to the mar­
gin of academic and judicial constitutional discourse, the realization that 
there is a racial dimension to the question, and that the right may have had 
greater and different significance for blacks and others less able to rely on the 
government's protection, has been even further on the periphery. The his­
tory of blacks and the right to bear arms, and the failure of most constitu­
tional scholars and policymakers to seriously examine that history, is in part 
another instance of the difficulty of integrating the study of the black experi­
ence into larger questions of legal and social policy.281 
Throughout American history, black and white Americans have had radi­
cally different experiences with respect to violence and state protection. Per­
haps another reason the Second Amendment has not been taken very 
seriously by the courts and the academy is that for many of those who shape 
or critique constitutional policy, the state's power and inclination to protect 
them is a given. But for all too many black Americans, that protection his­
toricaHy has not been available. Nor, for many, is it readily available today. 
If . in the past the state refused to protect black people from the horrors of 
white lynch mobs, today the state seems powerless in the face of the tragic 
black-on-black violence that plagues the mean streets of our inner cities, and 
279. August Meir & El liot Rudwick, J. Franklin Jameson. Carter G. Woodson, and the Founda­
tion of Black Historiography, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 1005, 1005 ( 1 984). 
280. See. e.g .. Schmidt, supra note 1 98, at 647 (describing the way in which the Supreme Court 
failed to uphold the Fifteen t h  Amendment in the late 1 9th and early 20th centuries); see also Ran· 
dall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of legal Academia. 1 02 HARV. L. REV . 1 745, 1 753-54 ( 1989) 
(discussing the legal academia's wil lingness to ignore the Reconstruction Amendments in the early 
20th century). 
28 1 .  One scholar has criticized the failure of legal scholars with a left perspective "to incorporate 
the authentic experience of minority communities in America." Jose Bracamonte. Foreword to 
Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical legal Studies Mol'f!mtnt. 22 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. 
REV. 297, 298 ( 1 982). 
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at times seems blind to instances of unnecessary police brutality visited upon 
minority populations. 282 
Admittedly, the racial atmosphere in this nation today is better than at any 
time prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1 965. 283 It must also be 
stressed, however, that many fear a decline in the quality of that atmosphere. 
One cause for concern is the Supreme Court's assault in its 1989 Term on 
gains of the civil rights movement that had stood for decades. 284 Another is 
the prominence of former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, a member of 
the Louisiana state legislature and a defeated, but nonetheless major, candi­
date for the Senate in 1990.285 In the last several years, two blacks who had 
entered the "wrong" neighborhood in New York City have been 
"lynched."286 Is this a sign of more to come? The answer is not clear, but 
the question is. 
Twice in this nation's history-once following the Revolution, and again 
after the Civil War-America has held out to blacks the promise of a nation 
282. The beating of Rodney King on March 3, 199 1 ,  by members of the Los Angeles Police 
Department, captured on tape by a serendipitous amateur photographer, has focused attention re­
cently on the problem of police brutality, though the problem predates and presumably continues 
beyond the incident. See Tracey Wood & Faye Fiore, Beating Victim Says He Obeyed Police, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at Al.  
283. Pub. L. No. 89- 1 10, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at  42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1 988)). 
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only reconsideration of Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), on the issue of whether the right 
to contract on a basis equal with whites under Civil Rights Act of 1 866 includes the right to be free 
from discriminatory working conditions, but also overruling Runyon); Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 
755 ( 1 989) (conferring on whites claiming reverse discrimination a continuing right to challenge 
consent decrees involving affinnative action); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
( 1989) (essentially shifting the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases, such that an 
employee must go beyond the showing of a disparate impact on a group protected by the statute; 
also allowing an employer to establish a legitimate business justification as a defense, replacing the 
standard established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 ( 1 97 1), which required an em­
ployer to show that a discriminatory practice was indispensable or essential); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 ( 1989) (subjecting remedial measures involving affirmative action to the 
same standard of strict scrutiny as in cases of invidious racial discrimination). 
285.  See e.g. , Peter Applebome, Louisiana Tally is Seen as a Sign of Voter Unrest. N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 1990, at A l ;  David Maraniss, Duke Emerges from Loss Stronger Than Ever, WASH. PosT, 
Oc1. 8, 1990, at A l ;  James M. Perry, Duke's Strong Run in Louisiana Sends National Politicians a 
Shocking Message, WALL. ST. J . ,  Oct. 9, 1990, at A5. Moreover, as of the time of final editing, 
Duke had emerged from a field of four major candidates, including a member of Congress and the 
mcumbcnt governor, to face a former governor in a runoff election. See Ex Klan Leader in Louisi­
ana Runoff; Primary: David Duke Will Face Former Gov. Edwin Edwards, Who Led In Ballotting. 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991 ,  at A l .  
. 
286. Michael Griffith, "a 23-year-old black man[,) was struck and killed by a car on a Queens highway 
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that would live up to its ideology of equality and of freedom. Twice the 
nation has reneged on that promise. The ending of separate but equal under 
Brown v. Board in 1954, 287-the civil rights movement of the 1960s, culmi­
nating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,28& the Voting Rights Act of 1 965,289 
and the judicial triumphs of the 1960s and early 70s-all these have held out 
to blacks in this century that same promise. Yet, given this history, it is not 
unreasonable to fear that law, politics, and societal mores will swing the pen­
dulum of social progress in a different direction, to the potential detriment of 
blacks and their rights, property, and safety. 
The history of blacks, firearms regulations, and the right to bear arms 
should cause us to ask new questions regarding the Second Amendment. 
These questions will pose problems both for advocates of stricter gun con­
trols and for those who argue against them. Much of the contemporary 
crime that concerns Americans is in poor black neighborhoods290 and a case 
can be made that greater firearms restrictions might alleviate this tragedy. 
But another, perhaps stronger case can be made that a society with a dismal 
record of protecting a people has a dubious claim on the right to disarm 
them. Perhaps a re-examination of this history can lead us to a modern reali­
zation of what the framers of the Second Amendment understood: that it is 
unwise to place the means of protection totally in the hands of the state, and 
that self-defense is also a civil right. 
287. 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954). 
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